There are very important anomalous mental phenomena neuroscientists should be studying very carefully, because their existence is well-documented, and they provide important clues about whether brains make minds. Neuroscientists are very bad about studying most of these phenomena. Instead many neuroscientists waste time on studying what may be mere phantasms of their own creation. An example is the alleged phenomenon called aphantasia.
The term "aphantasia" was coined in a 2015 paper entitled "Lives without imagery -- congenital aphantasia." The authors claimed that there was a phenomenon that certain people had an inability to create images in their mind's eye. The late creation of this word "aphantasia" should make you suspicious that there does not really exist any such phenomenon. Why would there have been no word previously created for such a phenomenon if it were real?
In the paper we have a discussion of a research methodology that was a poor one. The authors somehow got the names of twenty people who had read an article about a patient MX who supposedly had an impairment in his ability to visually imagine, after a stroke. The article was a 2010 article by Carl Zimmer entitled "The Brain: Look Deep Into the Mind's Eye." The article actually failed to present any convincing evidence that this patient MX it discussed had lost any ability to visually imagine. The article's claims about which regions of the brain of patient MX were active when he was doing particular mental tasks were vague and unreliable claims lacking any numeric specifics. All regions of the brain are active at all times, with neurons firing between about 1 to 200 times per second. No claim about greater or less brain activity during some mental activity should be trusted unless it is backed up by specifics such as a discussion of a percent signal change.
The twenty people had written some person claiming that they had some impairment in their ability to imagine. One of the study authors (Adam Zeman) then sent these people a "loaded question" survey that seemed to be designed to elicit from them some report of a weak ability to visually imagine. Zeman sent a cover letter stating this:
"I am attaching two short questionnaires. I would be very grateful if you could complete and return these electronically. The first is newly created,...The second is a widely used ‘vividness of visual imagery questionnaire’. We expect you to rate your imagery at the low end of the spectrum – given what you have written – but it would be helpful to quantify your experience using this standard measure."
This is an appalling way to try to get objective data. In a ludicrous fashion violating any sensible standard of how to do an objective survey, the twenty people were explicitly told that there was an expectation that they should answer the survey in a way indicating poor visual imagination, because Zeman has stated, "We expect you to rate your imagery at the low end of the spectrum." A sensible cover letter to such people would have done nothing to create ideas in the people that they are expected to answer the questions in a particular way.
The paper also gives one of the surveys the twenty people were given. The survey is about as glaring an example of the use of "loaded questions" as you could possibly find. After three questions asking about the age, education and profession of the respondents, the fourth question is "When did you become aware that you were unable to form mental images?" That's a ludicrously loaded question that basically forces the respondents into a story line that they are unable to form mental images. Below are the questions 4 to 8 in the survey, which are absurdly slanted, forcing the respondents into a "I can't form mental pictures when I imagine things" narrative:
"When did you become aware that you were unable to form mental images?
How did you become aware of this?
Did this discovery have an emotional impact on you?
Is your lack of visual imagery total, or do you sometimes experience brief flashes of imagery?
Is your ability to imagine affected by whether your eyes are open or closed?"
We should disregard any results based on survey questions so absurdly biased and loaded. The survey is like a survey of husbands that starts out by asking them how long they have been beating their wives, and then asks how long they have been committing adultery with their mistresses. What would a decent, sensible survey on this topic look like? It would be one that did nothing to suggest in the minds of respondents some inability to imagine. You might have questions like this:
Please rate your ability to imagine things "in your mind's eye"
( ) Very poor
( ) Poor
( ) Average
( ) Above average
( ) Excellent
Any data that Zeman graphs in this paper is worthless, because it is based on responses he got after using the absurd survey procedure described above. In a 2024 paper Zeman cites the paper "The prevalence of aphantasia (imagery weakness) in the general population," claiming that it provides evidence that a tiny fraction of the population has aphantasia. The paper did a survey asking 502 college students to fill out something called the "Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire" survey (VVIQ), which Zeman reproduces on page 13 of his paper introducing the word "aphantasia. The survey is merely a self-report survey in which people are asked to imagine 16 things, and then rate each thing they imagined, using these possibilities:
"Perfecting clear and lively as real seeing 5
Clear and lively 4
Moderately clear and lively 3
Dim and vague; flat 2
No image at all, you only 'know' that you are thinking of the object 1"
According to the poor methodology of the "The prevalence of aphantasia (imagery weakness) in the general population" paper, anyone getting a total score between 16 and 32 is rated as having "aphantasia," a weakness in the ability to form mental image. That method makes no sense. You would get a score of 32 if you chose the second to last of the choices above, describing your mental images as "dim and vague." A normal image in the mind's eye is a dim image, and a rather vague image. So someone tending to rate his imaginary mental images as "dim and vague" does not provide any actual evidence that there is anything deficient or abnormal about his ability to imagine things or create mental "mind's eye" images.
Zeman has coined another word about imagination: the word "hyperphantasia," which he defines as the opposite of "aphantasia." He describes hyperphantasia as an ability to see things with unusual vividness when imagining them. In a paper Zeman lists his silly criteria for claiming that someone has "hyperphantasia" or "aphantasia.' It is simply that if you choose the answers marked 1 or 2 in the survey above, you are classified as having "aphantasia," and if you pick the answers marked 4 or 5 in the survey above, you are classified as having "hyperphantasia."
This procedure makes no sense. Answers to the questions in the "Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire" survey (VVIQ) would be largely random when someone was given that survey one time. Unless the same answers were given multiple times in different surveys taken by the same person, the answers would have little value as evidence.
I can imagine other more sensible ways to test the vividness of visual imagination. One technique (requiring a vocal conversation) might go like this:
(1) You repeatedly ask someone to imagine a physical object such as a car, dog or woman.
(2) You then each time follow up very quickly with a question designed to test how detailed or vivid the image was.
Below are some examples of how that might work:
Scientist: Now, I want you to take about ten seconds to try to clearly visualize a dog. Tell me when you're done.
Subject: Okay, I'm done.
Scientist: What type of dog was it?
A specific answer such as "a poodle" would indicate the subject had a real image in his mind's eye. Here is another example:
Scientist: Now, I want you to take about ten seconds to try to clearly visualize a car. Tell me when you're done.
Subject: Okay, I'm done.
Scientist: What color was the car?
A specific answer such as "red" would indicate the subject had a real image in his mind's eye.
In the same paper Zeman states this: "The first functional imaging study to compare people with aphantasia, hyperphantasia, and average imagery did not identify clear differences in brain activation during the imagery tasks, thus providing tentative evidence against the fourth proposal." Zeman has done nothing to show a brain basis for imagination. And his methods for categorizing people as having extremely poor and extremely good abilities to mentally visualize are so defective that his papers on this topic seem to be of little value.
A year 2025 study on the topic of aphantasia fails to provide any decent evidence for its reality. A small number of people were recruited from a Facebook group devoted to the topic of aphantasia; and such people (who all previously "self-identified as having aphantasia") were given surveys about the vividness of their visual imagery. Of course, people belonging to that group are people pre-conditioned to believe in the reality of aphantasia. So if you recruit from such a group, and only get people who claim to have aphantasia, and tell them you are doing a study of aphantasia (a claimed inability to form visual images), it is hardly surprising that some of them will report such an inability. People like to give scientists the answers they think scientists are hoping for, and to give answers consistent with their previous claims about themselves.
A good way to have questioned such people would have been to have done a series of rapid fire visualization requests followed by questions asking about the thing visualized. An example would be orally asking people to do something such as try as hard as possible to visualize a ball that can bounce, and then to immediately ask them orally, "What color was the ball?" Any answer mentioning a particular color would have been counted as evidence that the person did not have aphantasia.
We have in this study no decent evidence that people actually have aphantasia, but merely evidence that certain people have been indoctrinated in the doctrine that there is such a thing as aphantasia, and have identified themselves as belonging to a group of people with aphantasia (probably or possibly mainly because of the power of suggestion). Once a person has self-identified himself as someone with aphantasia, he may tend to always describe his mental imagery as being weak (something easy for someone to honestly do, because mental imagery tends to be a shadowy kind of thing). The power of suggestion works wonders when it comes to the social construction of novel mental symptoms. If scientists do enough teaching that some people have a Mental Symptom X, then some tiny fraction of the population will probably identify themselves as having Mental Symptom X, even if there is no real basis for believing in Mental Symptom X.
