Sunday, October 11, 2026

You Cannot Reliably Reconstruct What Someone Saw or Thought From Only an fMRI Brain Scan

Another day, another unfounded claim of "mind reading from brain scans." 

Brains do not have any representation of what a person is thinking or seeing. And the idea that you could ever detect what a person was thinking or seeing from an fMRI scan is unbelievable. What is it that an fMRI machine actually detects? Speaking roughly, we can say that an fMRI machine detects changes in blood flow in different parts of the brain. Speaking more precisely, we can say that the exact thing measured is differences in hemoglobin levels in different parts of the brain. Hemoglobin is a molecule that contains iron. And machines such as fMRI machines are all based on magnetism, magnetism that can detect iron levels very precisely. 

This description may surprise a typical person who has been led to think that fMRI machines detect changes in electrical activity in parts of the brain. An fMRI machine does not directly measure changes in electrical activity in the brain. All that it measures are changes in blood flow, and hemoglobin changes related to changes in blood flow. The Google Gemini graphic below tells you precisely what is measured by an fMRI scanner. 

What fMRI measures

So how should we react when we see an article in the press like the recent one entitled "This ‘Mind-Reading’ AI Is a Wiz at Figuring Out What You See"?  The article has this paragraph:

"Brain-IT takes advantage of the thing that AI is best at, which is pattern recognition. It takes in data from functional MRI brain scans, which track changes in blood flow and oxygen in the brain to measure brain activity, and then uses that data to recreate the images the person was thinking about when the scans took place."

As soon as we read that paragraph, we should say to ourselves "this must be a shady trick." That's because what a person sees and thinks about sure as heck is not represented in the brain as changes in blood flow.  

The quote above does not even match the title, which refers to what people were seeing, not what "the person was thinking about." 

When you encounter cannot-possibly-be-true claims like this made by neuroscientists or their lackeys,  it is usually pretty much a waste of time to try to track down exactly how the ruse was carried out. Neuroscientists who engage in these kind of misleading parlor trick shenanigans are pretty good about "covering their tracks." Typically, they present their results in papers that discuss some extremely convoluted and opaque methodology, one that makes it hard to untangle the funny business cheats that were going on. It's rather like some money launderer transferring funds between shell companies to minimize the chance that some investigator will be able to track down how the money was laundered. 

But there are some things you can do to expose the baloney that is occurring. One is to simply look for whether the paper authors ever claim that their not-really-mind-reading results were obtained solely from inputs of brain scans. If you fail to find such a claim, it is a pretty sure sign that the results were not obtained solely from inputs of brain scans. 

What typically goes on is some situation rather like this:

Inputs:

Brain scans

Something else

Some other thing (maybe some sneaky data back door)

Some other thing not mentioned in the press release

Outputs:

Some image looking a little like what someone saw or thought of

The result will be sold as an impressive result produced "from brain scans," without any mention of the crucial inputs that were not brain scans. And typically we will have displayed some best-looking results, and we should ask: were these cherry-picked best results, or were they the average results produced? Typically we don't know what is the answer to that question. It's easy to get best-looking results if you cherry-pick best results. For example, if you spend all day guessing the results from a random number generator generating three digits, you'll probably be able to make an impressive-looking table of good guesses, if you are allowed to cherry-pick best results. 

A look at the scientific paper makes us suspect that the results are not so impressive. The paper misleads us in the first sentence of its abstract, claiming, "Reconstructing images seen by people from their fMRI brain recordings provides a non-invasive window into the human brain."  You cannot do any such thing using inputs of only fMRI brain scans. 

It takes some practice to be able to find the part of a paper like this where the authors reveal that their outputs were not produced solely from inputs of fMRI scans. Typically the authors of paper like this write paragraph after paragraph of the most convoluted prose, attempting to "cover their tracks" so that it is not easy to discover their cheats. In this case I found in the BRAIN-IT paper this paragraph, which lets you know the shady business that was occurring (I will underline and boldface a phrase not underlined and boldfaced in the original text):

"Enriching the Training Data. The training is performed using pairs of fMRI measurements and the corresponding images viewed by the subject, taken from the NSD dataset (see Sec. 5.1). The model is trained on data from all subjects simultaneously. Since the subject-specific data is limited, we further enrich the training set with 'external images' (natural images without any fMRI). Specifically, we use ∼120k natural images from the unlabeled portion of COCO dataset."

The Section 5.1 referred to says this:

"We used the Natural Scenes Dataset (NSD) (Allen et al., 2022), a large publicly available 7-Tesla fMRI dataset that records fMRI of 8 subjects as they viewed diverse images drawn from COCO (Lin et al., 2014). The dataset contains ∼73,000 Image-fMRI pairs, comprising ∼9,000 unique images per subject and 1,000 images shared by all subjects."

So what is going on seems to be something like this:

Inputs:

1. fMRI brain scans taken when people saw particular images.

2. The exact images that those people saw during such brain scans.

Outputs

Something sometimes looking pretty close to what was seen by those people when the brain scans were taken.

The paper has the title "BRAIN-IT: IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION FROM FMRI VIA BRAIN-INTERACTION TRANSFORMER." It seems the paper should have been titled something like "Reconstructing Images from Brain Scans of People Seeing the Images and Also From the Images They Saw." If the paper had that title, people would know that nothing of much significance was going on. 

You cannot reliably reconstruct what someone saw or thought from a mere fMRI brain scan, which does not even directly measure brain activity or brain states. So whenever you read a paper like this in the future, you can be pretty confident that some kind of cheat or parlor trick or shady business is going on. It's almost always some kind of data back door cheat, whereby the paper authors smuggle in non-neural inputs, often inputs that are pretty much the same as the outputs. 

A press release on this paper seems to have an untrue caption at the top an image entitled "Pictures on the Brain." We see a grid showing a set of image pairs, and each pair looks very similar. We read the claim that the images on the left are images shown to people who were brain scanned, and that the images on the right are the images produced by the "Brain-IT" program or model, and that this model or program had "never before seen" these images or the corresponding brain activity scans. This does not match the statements in the scientific paper, which makes no corresponding claims. The scientific paper has  a grid image (Figure 5) similar to the "Pictures on the Brain" image in the press release, but with different images; and the caption of Figure 5 of the paper does not claim that the images on the left are images shown to people who were brain scanned, and that the images on the right are the images produced by the "Brain-IT" program or model, and that the model had never seen before these images or the corresponding brain activity scans. The scientific paper also has lot of other similar-looking image grids. But the captions of those grids do not claim that the model had never seen before these images or the corresponding brain activity scans.

The press release uses the phrase "never before seen" as described above, but the paper never uses the word "never" in its text, and does not have any relevant corresponding phrase meaning "never before seen." My best guess is that we have here some anonymous institutional press release writer doing what institutional press release writers so very often do these days -- making false or misleading statements about the research the press release is promoting, while trying to make it look like some great feat was accomplished when that was not done. 

The scientific paper has lots of impressive-looking image grids comparing one image on the left and an almost-identical-looking image on the right (they look like the top half of the image below). But the captions of these image grids are so short and skimpy (consisting of only a sentence or two) that readers cannot tell exactly how the results were obtained, and we can have no high confidence that anything very impressive has occurred.  If the authors wish to command attention for their results, they should replace their super-skimpy figure captions with full, detailed captions giving maybe 15 or 20 sentences describing exactly what went on to produce these image grids. 

The paper "Spurious reconstruction from brain activity" refers to problems with some papers using the same Natural Scenes Dataset mentioned above. The paper says, "In the field of machine learning, 'zero-shot' prediction refers to the ability of a model to accurately predict or classify novel contents not encountered during the training phase (Larochelle et al., 2008, Palatucci et al., 2009). " In the paper for this Brain-IT model, we do not hear the phrase "zero-shot" mentioned. So why was a caption of the press release discussed above making it sound like such "zero-shot" prediction had been achieved?

The paper suggests that there is something about this Natural Scenes Dataset that makes it particularly easy to get impressive-looking  results when using it. Below is Figure 2 from the "Spurious reconstruction from brain activity"  paper.  We see that some models get impressive results using the Natural Scenes Dataset. But when a different image dataset is used (the Deeprecon image dataset), the models perform poorly. 


There is one other important consideration. When we see some paper showing some "successful image reconstruction grid" like those we see in the Brain-IT paper discussed above, we should always ask: were these successful-looking results typical results from the model trying to reconstruct what someone saw when his brain was scanned, or instead were the displayed results some best results cherry-picked from a much larger set in which results that good were very untypical? I doubt that we get the answer to that question from either the press release or the the Brain-IT paper discussed above.

The Brain-IT paper discussed above has not yet been published in a scientific journal. At the end of the paper the authors say, "Upon publication, we will release our full code with saved checkpoints to ensure that all results are easily reproducible." Inspection of the software code in projects such as this will often reveal various types of funny business, cheats or machinations. 

Previous efforts of this type involved the most outrageous types of cheats and shady sleight-of-hand. In my 2023 post here I describe one effort. Experimenters grabbed text annotations from an image database (descriptions of what the images showed), and then fed those text phrases into an AI image generator, to produce images that were then claimed as images "derived from brain scans," because brain scans were included in some convoluted pipeline that included such a technique.  That was something that was the shadiest smoke-and-mirrors trickery, something so bad any decent scholar should have been ashamed of such work. 

I don't know whether trickery that outrageous is going on in the latest claim of "mind reading from brain scans." I do know this: in general, what someone saw or thought cannot be reconstructed from mere fMRI brain scans taken when that person saw or thought something (largely because such scans merely detect blood flow changes in the brain). So whenever anyone suggests or insinuates that what someone saw or thought was reconstructed from only fMRI brain scans, there must as a general rule be some bad kind of trickery or badly misleading language or very misleading funny business going on. 

Wednesday, October 7, 2026

Follies of the "One Rat Per Scientist" Researchers

The recent junk science paper "Hippocampal theta sweeps indicate goal direction during navigation" is another joke of a neuroscience research paper, one in which the main study group size is the same size as the number of authors, which should make us laugh hard and say: "What was the rule here: only one rat per researcher?"

one rat per scientist

We have in this study a study group size of only five rats, which is at least 300% too small for any reliable result to be claimed. No control group was used (an error as bad as the use of a way-too-small study group). The number of paper authors is five. So it is very definitely a "one rat per scientist" situation. 

You can do a Google image search for "Effect size versus sample size" to get an idea about the relation between the two, and another thing called statistical power. Some of the visuals you will see may be hard to understand. The visual below describes the situation in an easy to understand way. 

neuroscience sample sizes

The smaller the effect size, the larger the study group size needed to show something in a convincing manner (such as a statistical power of 80%).  Most effect sizes in neuroscience are small.  That means in the great majority of cases a study group of 25 or more is needed. No experimental neuroscience study should be taken seriously if it uses a smallest study group size smaller than 15 subjects. It is conceivable that a neuroscience experimental study using 15 or 20 subjects might provide modest evidence for something, but only in the very unlikely case of a high effect size. For the much more likely case of an effect size that is only medium or low, then at least about 35 subjects per study group are needed. 

As a general rule, we should be dismissing as junk science any experimental neuroscience study that fails to either use at least 15 or 20 subjects per study group or fails to do a sample size calculation to determine whether the number of subjects was adequate to achieve a good statistical power such as 80%. If the smallest study group size is between 15 and 30, we should only regard the paper as being possibly modest evidence for something if the authors did a sample size calculation to show that with the effect size of the type they are dealing with, the study group size they used was adequate to achieve a good statistical power. 

The authors of this one-rat-per-scientist paper confess, "No statistical methods were employed for determining the sample size for the experimental data." A sample size calculation would have shown how way-too-small the study group size was. 

The paper is being promoted as evidence of goal representations in the brain. It is no such thing, because of its severe defects discussed above.  What went on was that brain waves were read from five moving rats who were moving toward some goal.  It is well-known that muscle movement produces all kinds of severe contamination of brain-wave readings (which is why when a neurologist takes an EEG reading), you are told to stay very still). The authors have analyzed the data, and claimed to have found something they think is evidence of goals held in the brains of the rats. This is just "see what you want to see" pareidolia. like someone seeing the face of Jesus in his toast. Nowadays neuroscientists are very abundantly making groundless uses of the words "represent" and "representation." The situation has got so bad (with so very many groundless uses of those words by neuroscientists) that it is now a good general rule of thumb to never trust a neuroscientist researcher using the word "represent" or "representation," unless he produces a best-practices experimental study of a type that would be the "quality opposite" of the study I have discussed. 

neuroscience experiments done right

Saturday, October 3, 2026

A Neurosurgeon's Case for the Soul Is Good, But Could Have Been Much Better

The year 2025 book The Immortal Mind: A Neurosurgeon's Case for the Existence of the Soul by Michael Egnor and Denyse O' Leary is a book that covers many cases that have been discussed on this site since the year 2018. On page 10 Egnor says this:

"As a busy neurosurgeon who has performed over seven thousand brain operations, a medical school professor who has taught young medical school students and aspiring neurosurgeons for forty years, and as a researcher who has applied the rigorous methods of science to discoveries about how the brain works, I have come to see that the human soul is real and that human beings are not mere machines made of meat."

On pages 5-6 Egnor says this:

"I saw many patients with brain damage, whether from birth, bullets, blood clots or tumors. And yet their minds -- their ability to think and reason and believe and desire -- didn't seem as damaged as their brains."

On page 6 he describes a woman who had a brain tumor in her left frontal lobe. He says this:

"During the surgery, I spoke with her continuously as I was quietly removing most of her left frontal lobe. She maintained a perfectly normal conversation throughout the surgery."

On pages 16 to 17 Egnor recalls performing his first split-brain operation. This is an operation in which surgeons sever the corpus callosum, a bundle of fibers that connect the left half of the brain with the right half of the brain. The radical operation is sometimes done to stop very bad seizures resistant to drug treatment. Egnor recalls that his patient named Sam seemed normal after the operation:

"His vision was normal, and so was his speech. In fact, the only thing different about Sam....was that he was no longer having major seizures. And he certainly seemed like a single, unified person....He told me repeatedly that his inner experiences were just the same as before the surgery."

On page 17 Egnor says this:

"Since I operated on Sam, I've cared for a number of patients who had split-brain surgery. Like other neurosurgeons, I found no evidence, either from ordinary clinical examination or events in their lives, that indicates their minds were split, even though their brains were."  

parts of the brain

On pages 36-37 Egnor recalls his surgery on a boy named Charles who had a severe head injury. Egnor removed half of the boy's cerebellum, a part of the brain involved in muscular activity. Egnor says that four weeks after the operation "I could find no neurological defect at all." He says, "His cognition, speech and motor skills were like that of any other four-year-old, even though he was missing half of his cerebellum." Many years later Egnor learned that Charles was in the NCAA "playing basketball at a high level." Egnor says on page 37, "Neurosurgeons routinely remove large parts of the cerebellum to treat strokes and tumors, and most patients retain normal coordination."

On pages 46-47 Egnor tells of a patient named Katie. We see a brain scan picture showing most of the child's brain missing. In an article Egnor  says Katie "had a third of the brain that her sister had," her fraternal twin. In the article Egnor tells us that Katie "sat and talked and walked earlier than her sister," "made the honor roll," and "will soon graduate high school."

On page 48 mentions a patient named Maria who had only two-thirds of her brain, but who "finished her Master's Degree in English literature." On the same page he mentions a Jesse who had a brain that was half full of water. He says Jesse "became a normal happy middle schooler." On the same page he mentions that 25 percent of those born with no corpus callosum (the nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres of the brain) show no symptoms. He references the paper "Structural neuroplastic responses preserve functional connectivity and neurobehavioural outcomes in children born without corpus callosum" which you can read here. That paper tells us that one child born without a corpus callosum had an IQ of 126, far above average. 

On pages 49-50 Egnor tells us that a Chinese woman who had lived a normal life was found by a brain scan to have no cerebellum. We read that a paper making a search of the medical literature found nine cases of people born without a cerebellum, one of which was completely normal, and two of which were mentally normal. 

Later Egnor begins to discuss near-death experiences. On page 100 he cites a case of a nine-year-old boy named Eddie who had a near-death experience, and reported seeing his sister Teresa in heaven. The boy was told that Teresa was actually at college. But it was then discovered that Teresa had died in a car accident shortly before Eddie's experience. 

Whenever discussing accounts such as these, it is important to track down the original account. Egnor quoted a paper by Bruce Greyson (a very interesting paper discussed at length in my 2014 post here entitled They Seemed to Know of Deaths They Should Not Have Known Of"). But Greyson is not the original source of this account. The original source is pages 44 to 45 of the 1995 book "Children of the Light: The startling and inspiring truth about children's near-death experiences and how they illumine the beyond" by Brad Steiger and Sherry Hansen Steiger.  Below are those pages:


The source of the account is identified two pages earlier as "Doctor K. M. Dale, who practiced medicine for many years in the Pittsburgh area." The boy is identified as Eddie Cuomo. 

Egnor and O'Leary make a good case for the soul, and a good case against the claim that the brain is the source of the human mind. But their case could have been much stronger. Oddly, they have almost completely failed to discuss the topic of human memory. A deep dive into that topic could have led to very many other strong reasons for believing in a human soul, such as the failure of neuroscientists to ever discover by microscopic examination any evidence of learned information in the brain, the failure of neuroscientists to advance any credible theory of how a brain could store memories, a failure of neuroscientists to present any credible theory explaining the wonder of instant human learning, the failure of neuroscientists to explain the lifelong preservation of memories, and the failure of neuroscientists to present any credible theory explaining the wonder of instant human recall of correct detailed answers when someone is asked a question. Egnor and O'Leary also fail to discuss the very important topic of brain physical shortfalls: all the physical limitations of human brains (such as unreliable synaptic transmission and the short lifetimes of synapses and synaptic proteins) that rule out claims that brains are the source of human minds and the storage place of human memories.  Egnor and O'Leary also fail to discuss many things that today's scientists generally fail to study, but which provide strong additional evidence for a human soul: things such as apparition sightings, deathbed visions, and the strong evidence for clairvoyance and ESP.  So while Egnor and O'Leary's case for a human soul is good, it is much less strong than it could have been. 

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

10 Years and Billions Spent, But the "Human Brain Project" Failed to Confirm Brain Dogmas

There have in recent decades been two gigantic brain research projects: (1) the BRAIN Initiative funded by the United States, and (2) the Human Brain Project funded by the European Union. The BRAIN Initiative has been funded for 13 years and has received several billions of dollars in funding. The grand ambition of the BRAIN Initiative and its failure to succeed in such an ambition is discussed in my post here. 

The Human Brain Project lasted from 2013 to 2023. In a previous post in late 2023 I discussed the failure of the project to produce any evidence backing up the main claims of neuroscientists about brains making minds and brains storing memories. But in July 2024 there was released a 61-page "10 Years Assessment" document summarizing the results of the Human Brain Project, a document I have not yet discussed. Let us look at that document, which you can read here. 

The document has this official-looking front page:


The assessment starts out with groundless boasting, making untrue statements about a "paradigm shift" that never occurred. 

"Between 2013-2023, the HBP [Human Brain Project] flagship brought together more than 500 scientists, engineers and clinicians from all over Europe. They shared a vision of unravelling the mysteries of the human brain through advanced computational methods and cutting-edge technologies. This interdisciplinary collaboration resulted in a paradigm shift in brain research and in groundbreaking developments in neuroscience, computer science, robotics and data management."

We have several pages talking about models and technologies and data sets and so forth, without anything very exciting-sounding being mentioned. Section 4.2 of the document then contradicts itself. On the left side it confesses, "However, the ultimate goal of elucidating human behaviour and cognition through neuroscience was not sufficiently supported within the project particularly in the early stages, although the influence of this work grew towards the latter stages of the HBP [Human Brain Project]."  That sounds like something someone would say if a project had failed to explain cognition through neuroscience. But the right side of the same page has a bullet list mentioning "significant advances in our understanding of human cognition and its brain bases, realized in a large number of publications in leading international journals." We get no specifics backing up this claim, which is not correct. No such advances occurred. 

In the same section 4.6 we read of claims that sound like excuses for why the Human Brain Project failed to show a brain basis for cognition. The statements include these:

  • "Activities focused on cognition were not well integrated into the HBP despite their emphasis within the project."
  • "An early decision was made to restructure the work subsumed under ‘Cognitive Architectures’ meaning it was subsequently scaled back and the relative allocation of resources (budget/personnel) was reduced."
  • "Moreover, the scientific investigations relating to cognition and the brain proceeded mainly independently, often without capitalizing on significant advances on connectomics and neurodevelopmental research findings from outside of the HBP."
This sounds like making excuses for a failure to show a brain basis for cognition. 

The report goes on and on, talking about technologies and AI and models and data sets and brain atlases and "neuromorphic computing" (a misnomer which is really just computing not bearing any close resemblance to what goes on is brains). What we fail to get is any description of something that was learned by the Human Brain Project that helps clarify how humans learn or recall or think or imagine or form beliefs. 

A review of all of the references that the text of the 61-page document makes to either "learning" or "memory" fails to find a discussion of any progress in learning about how human learning or human recall occurs. The document does not use the words "recall," "recollection" or "remember." The document also fails to use the word "engram," the word neuroscientists use when they are speculating about a storage place of memories in the brain. 

The main theory of neuroscientists about a brain storage of memories is the theory that memories are stored in synapses. The Human Brain Project 10-year assessment document only uses the word "synapses" twice. The first reference is this: "Within each module, the emulation of 512 neurons and 115,000 synapses takes place, achieving computational speeds 104 times faster than biological time."  That's a mere reference to something going on in a computer. The second reference is to a company called Synapse Biomedical Inc. The document uses the word "synaptic" nine times, never in an impressive way. 

The most impressive-sounding of these uses of the word "synaptic" is  this line: "HBP [Human Brain Project] researchers investigated the impact of attention, synaptic tags, feedback connections, and neuromodulators on learning."  We then read of three papers that were published as a result of these publications. They are these:
  • "Natural gradient learning for spiking neurons," co-authored by Kreutzer.  This very short paper discusses no observations about brains or synapses. 
  • "NMDA-driven dendritic modulation enables multitask representation learning in hierarchical sensory processing pathways" co-authored by Wybo. The paper is a good example of how fiddling around with software is being passed off as "neuroscience research." The paper deals almost entirely with some computer software system, making only passing references to brain chemistry. Parts of that software system are being misleadingly named after parts of the brain. So when the authors state "learning at the dendritic synapses was orchestrated by an online error-weighted Hebbian plasticity rule during a continuous stream of inputs (Fig. 6B)," they are not referring to dendritic synapses in any brain, but are most misleadingly referring to parts of a computer software system that have been incorrectly called "dendritic synapses." And in many other places when the authors refer to "neurons" they are referring not to neurons in a brain, but to parts of their computer software system that have been misleadingly called "neurons." And when their Figure 6 begins with the phrase "dendritic branches learn," this is a reference not to actual dendritic branches in a brain, but to parts of a computer software system that have been misleadingly called "dendritic branches." 
  • "Deep Gated Hebbian Predictive Coding Accounts for Emergence of Complex Neural Response Properties Along the Visual Cortical Hierarchy" a paper co-authored by Dora. The authors say, "We developed a scalable, deep network architecture for predictive coding that is trained using a gated Hebbian learning rule and mimics the feedforward and feedback connectivity of the cortex." This is more misleading work in which people are fooling around with computer software systems, and incorrectly claiming that such activity tells us something about the brain. We have the same kind of extremely misleading language as in the previous paper mentioned. So, for example, when the authors in Figure 1 refer to "neurons," they are not referring to neurons in a brain, but are instead referring to parts of their computer software system that have been misleadingly called "neurons."  And when they refer to "neuronal activities...of all neurons," they are referring not to activity of neurons in the brain, but to mere activity in their computer software system. 

deceptive neuroscientists

These were the kind of "brain learning" papers that got funded by the Human Brain Project.  Very high in misleading content, such papers did nothing to help explain how a brain could learn or recall. Like the BRAIN Initiative that spent billions but failed to do anything to help justify "brains make minds" and "brain store memories" dogmas, the Human Brain Project spent billions while failing to do anything to substantiate such beliefs, which are not well-established facts, but merely socially constructed tenets of a conformist belief community. 

Friday, September 25, 2026

Neuroscientists Keep Writing Papers Bluffing Us About Memory Encoding

 " We do not yet have a systematic theory of how information is encoded in the chemical and electrical activity of neurons, how it is fused to determine behavior on short time scales, and how it is used to adapt, refine, and learn behaviors on longer time scales. " -- "BRAIN 2025: A Scientific Vision," document co-authored by many scientists (link). 

If we are to believe in the claim that brains store human memories, we must have a credible account of four things: encoding, neural storage of very old memories, the instantaneous formation of memories, and the instantaneous retrieval of memories. The theory that human memories are stored in the brain fails in regard to each of these things.

There exists no plausible theory as to how a brain could store memories lasting for 50 years, but we know humans can remember many things for that long. The most popular idea of brain memory storage claims that memories are stored in synapses, but the proteins in synapses have an average lifetime of less than two weeks, meaning such a theory falls short by a factor of 1000 when it comes to explaining memories that persist for 50 years. As for memory retrieval, there is no theory explaining how humans could possibly recall instantly things they learned many years ago, and haven't thought about in years. 

You may hear the name of some obscure historical or cultural figure you learned about decades ago, and haven't heard about or thought about since that time. You may then instantly recall something about that person. But if that memory was stored somewhere in your brain, how could you instantly find the exact little location where that memory was? Doing that (for example, instantly finding a memory in storage spot 834,220 out of 1,200,000) would be like instantly finding a needle in a mountain-sized haystack. If a brain had an indexing system, or a coordinate system, or a neuron numbering system, there might be a faint hope for explaining instantaneous memory retrieval; but the brain has no such things. As for the instantaneous formation of memories, there is no theory that can account for it in a brain. The prevailing theory that memories are stored by synapse strengthening (which would involve protein synthesis requiring minutes) fails to account for memories that humans can form instantly.

When we consider the issue of memory encoding, we find a difficulty as great as the difficulties just discussed. Encoding is supposedly some translation that occurs so that a memory can be physically stored in a brain, so that it might last for years. The problem is that human memories include incredibly diverse types of things, and we have no idea how most of these things could be stored as neural states. Consider only a few of the types of things that can be stored in a human memory:

  • Memories of daily experiences, such as what you were doing on some day
  • Facts you learned in school, such as the fact that Lincoln was shot at Ford's Theater
  • Sequences of numbers such as your social security number
  • Sequences of words, such as the dialog an actor has to recite in a play
  • Sequences of musical notes, such as the notes an opera singer has to sing
  • Abstract concepts that you have learned
  • Memories of particular non-visual sensations such as sounds, food tastes, smells, pain, and physical pleasure
  • Memories of how to do physical things, such as how to ride a bicycle
  • Memories of how you felt at emotional moments of your life
  • Rules and principles, such as “look both ways before crossing the street”
  • Memories of visual information, such as what a particular person's face looks like

How could all of these very different types of information ever be translated into neural states so that a brain could store them?

Our neuroscientists have told us again and again that the brain does such an encoding, but there is no real evidence that any such thing takes place. What we have evidence for is merely evidence that humans remember things. If you are someone who believes that memories are physically stored in brains, then you may claim that memory encoding occurred at such and such a rate whenever you observe people learning something at such and such a rate. But merely observing evidence of learning or memory is not acquiring any actual evidence that encoding has occurred. There remains the possibility that our memories are not stored as neural states, the possibility that our repository of memory is some spiritual or psychic facility that is non-neural and non-biological.

Such a possibility should not seem remote when we consider that there is no workable theory as to how learned knowledge and experiences could be encoded so that they might be stored in a brain. No matter what theory we may create to account for the encoding of learned knowledge and episodic experience so that they can be stored in a brain, such a theory will always end up sounding ridiculous after we examine the theory in detail and consider its requirements and shortcomings. Let's look at some possibilities, and why they fail.

Theory #1: Direct writing of words and images

First, let's consider the simplest theory of encoding we can imagine – that a memory is stored in the brain so that it appears in a neural form pretty much as we see it in our minds. Under this theory, when you memorized some series of words, this would cause a sequence of microscopic little letters to become stored in your brain; and when you experienced some visual experience, this would get stored as some tiny little image in your brain. So, for example, under this theory, if someone memorized the sentence, “There may be green aliens in the center of the galaxy,” then after the person died, some scientist might examine that person's brain with an electron microscope, and actually find some tiny little words in some neurons, words that directly spelled out, “There may be green aliens in the center of the galaxy.” And under this theory, if someone was given a picture of a toy purple pony, and asked to memorize it, then after the person died, a scientist might be able to examine the person's brain under an electron microscope, and the scientist might say, “Aha, I see in his neurons a tiny little image of a toy purple pony.”

This theory may immediately provoke giggles, and it is rather easy to think of some reasons why it does not work. They are these:
  1. If memory worked in such a way, we would surely have already discovered such easily-recognizable memory traces. But no such things have been seen, even though a great deal of human neural tissue has been examined at very high magnification. When we look at brain tissue at the highest magnification, we see no tiny little letters or tiny little images of animals, cars, and persons.
  2. For a brain to be able to write words that we memorized in this type of direct manner, it would seem that the brain would need some very precise write mechanism, capable of forming the exact characters of the alphabet in brain tissue; but no such brain capability is known to exist.
  3. It seems that if such a theory were true, recalling some words would be like reading. But recalling words is almost never like reading, and we don't see in our mind's eye some stream of letters as we recall some words we memorized.
  4. For a brain to be able to read words that we memorized in this type of direct manner, it would seem that the brain would need some very precise reading mechanism, capable of reading the exact characters of the alphabet stored in very tiny letters written in brain tissue; but no such thing is known to exist. We don't have tiny little “micro-eyes” in our brains that might allow us to read tiny microscopic letters stored in our brains.
  5. Alphabets of modern languages are relatively recent inventions. For example, the English alphabet is not many  thousands of years old. There has no been no change in brain structure for many thousands of years, and we can think of no  reason why brains would have some ability allowing it to write an alphabet that only came into existence centuries or a few thousand years ago, not many thousands of years ago. 
Theory #2: Brain storage of words and images using some unknown non-binary coding or translation protocol

Now, let's consider a different theory of memory encoding – the idea that instead of directly storing words and images (so that we could directly read the words and directly see the images), the brain uses some type of unknown coding or translation protocols. For example, it could conceivably be that words that we learn are somehow translated into proteins or chemicals or electrical states, using some as-of-yet undiscovered translation scheme.

For example, such a scheme might work a little like this:

ItemHow the item might be represented
Letter “A”Some particular neural arrangement of atoms, chemicals or electricity
Letter “B”Some other neural arrangement of atoms, chemicals or electricity
Letter “C”Some other neural  arrangement of atoms, chemicals or electricity

Such a scheme might work a little like the Morse code, in which particular letters are translated into some sequence of dots, dashes, or dots and dashes. Some particular arrangement of atoms, chemicals or electricity might work like a dot in the Morse code, and some other particular arrangement of atoms, chemicals or electricity might work like a dash in the Morse code.

Or there could be some higher-level translation system based on particular words rather than letters. For example, we can imagine something like this:

ItemHow the item might be represented
Word “sun”Some particular neural arrangement of atoms, chemicals, proteins or electricity
Word “man”Some other neural arrangement of atoms, chemicals, proteins or electricity
Word “move”Some other neural  arrangement of atoms, proteins chemicals or electricity

There is one giant problem with such a theory. All of the languages that we use are fairly recent innovations, having been created in only the last few percent of the time that humans have existed. For example, back in the Roman Empire people used Latin, but the English we use today has only been in use for less than 1200 years. The alphabet used for English is less than 1000 years old, and its alphabetic predecessor (the Latin alphabet) is only a few thousand years old. It is generally acknowledged even by Darwinism enthusiasts that very complex evolutionary innovations cannot arise in only a few centuries of time or a few thousand years. So we could never explain how the brain could naturally possess some elaborate translation system based on such a relatively recent innovation as the English language and the English alphabet.

Scientists strain our credulity whenever they talk about novel functional genes accidentally appearing even over the course of a million years. Think, then, on how much greater a problem there would be in explaining how hundreds of novel functional genes could have appeared in less than 3000 years, to perform some translation operation involving characters and words that have existed for less than 3000 years. To assume such a thing would be to assume evolution working thousands of times faster than the rate we would predict from known mutation rates.

There is also no evidence that any such great burst of genetic novelty has occurred. Although the half-life of DNA is 512 years, we have enough samples of human DNA from ancient Rome and ancient Egypt to know that there has been no big change in the DNA of humans during the past 3000 years. So it seems impossible that there could be any genetic capability (arising in the past few thousand years) that would allow humans to neurally store information using some encoding mechanism specifically tailored to the letters and words of the English language that have existed for less than 3000 years.

Another difficulty with the theory of encoding just mentioned is that if it existed, we would see big differences in the genes of people who spoke different languages. According to such a theory, we would expect that Chinese people would have one group of genes corresponding to proteins or RNA molecules needed to translate Chinese words into neural states, and that English speaking people would have some other quite different set of genes corresponding to proteins or RNA molecules needed to translate English words into neural states (particularly since the Chinese language and alphabet is so different from the English language and alphabet). But there exists no such difference in the genes of Chinese speaking people and English speaking people.

There is also the difficulty that there is no sign in the human genome that any such genes exist for performing such an elaborate operation of encoding human learned knowledge and episodic experience so that it can be stored in neurons or synapses (and there would need to be many hundreds or thousands of types of genes dedicated to performing such a task if it was done).

Theory #3: Binary writing of words and images

Now, let's consider a theory of memory encoding that perhaps the words we memorize and the images we remember are stored in binary format. We know that computers store information in binary format, so when it is suggested that the brain may use a similar format, this may sound reasonable to the average person (although it isn't, a brain being radically different from an electronic computer).

This possibility actually has all of the difficulties of the previous possibility. What goes on when your computer stores words in binary format is the following:
  1. First individual letters in the words are converted into decimal numbers (such as 13, 19, and 23) using a particular translation table called the ASCII code.
  2. Then, those numbers are converted from decimal to binary using a decimal-to-binary conversion routine.

So if we are to believe that the brain does binary encoding like a computer, we would need to believe that built into the brain on a low level is some type of translation scheme like the one below, a scheme in which letters are translated into decimal numbers.

ASCII table used by a computer to store encoded information

In addition, we would also have to believe that the brain has some kind of capability to translate the numbers in such a system into binary numbers. Alternately, we could believe that the brain has a scheme for directly translating characters into binary, but the overall complexity of such a translation mechanism would be every bit as great as a system in which characters are converted into decimal, and then into binary.

We have the following difficulties involved with such an idea:

  1. If memory worked in such a way, we would surely have already discovered such easily-recognizable memory traces. We would have discovered tiny little traces in the brain that resemble binary coding. But no such things have been seen, even though a great deal of neural tissue has been examined at very high magnification.
  2. For a brain to be able to write words that were memorized in this type of direct manner, it would seem that the brain would need some very precise write mechanism, capable of writing binary traces; but no such thing is known to exist.
  3. For a brain to be able to read words that we memorized in this type of direct manner, it would seem that the brain would need some very precise reading mechanism, capable of reading in binary; but no such thing is known to exist.
  4. Since the alphabets of human languages are only a few thousand years old, there would have been no time for the human body to have evolved some complex biological mechanism capable of converting specific alphabetic characters to binary.
  5. We can imagine no way in which a brain could achieve the translation effect in which words are translated into binary. As far as we know, there is nothing anything like an ASCII table in your brain, nor is there anything like a facility for translating English letters directly into binary, nor is there anything like a facility for translating English letters into decimal, and then translating decimal numbers into binary. There are no genes in the genome that perform such tasks.
The Scientists Who Keep Falsely Talking About Memory Encoding and Memory Representations in Brains

The simple fact is that there is not the slightest evidence of memory encoding or memory representation in the human brain. So why it that we keep getting scientific papers claiming to have seen memory encoding or memory representation in the human brain? It's pretty much a "they're talking like they had what they need to have but don't have" kind of affair.  Something similar might be going on if some street beggar were to try to attract women by frequently using finance terms. So someone without $20 to his name might speak like this:  "I think that WEALTH MANAGEMENT is very important, and I am slowly BUILDING MY FORTUNE in a way that will give me a HUGE BONANZA OF WEALTH once my INVESTMENT PLANS are actualized."

But how can someone write a paper making frequent references to memory encoding and memory representation in the brain, even though there is no evidence that such things exist?  The visual below shows the general approach typically used. 

memory encoding research plan

A key element is what can be called chance-mining. Chance-mining typically involves grandly trumpeting some little result that might easily be obtained by pure chance.  I can give an example of chance-mining. Suppose you are doing a study trying to prove what we may call "the Abracadabra Hypothesis," which you define as "the hypothesis that saying 'Abracadabra' before flipping a coin will increase the chance of a Heads result." Any test involving a sufficiently large sample size will fail to support this Abracadabra Hypothesis. That's because something called the Law of Large Numbers says that the more random trials you do, the more the result will tend to match the result expected by chance. But it is very easy to get a test result deviating from what is expected by chance, if you use a very small sample.  For example, it is easy to flip ten coins and get 6 or 7 Heads results, even though the expected chance result is 5.

So if you want to do a paper claiming to support the Abracadabra Hypothesis, you can try a test using a small number of coin flips such as only 10 or 20. If that fails, you can file the results in your file drawer, and start a new experiment, also using a small number of coin flips. Probably before long you will have some result you can claim as "statistically significant." Chance-mining like this misleads people, because it creates the impression that there is a causal relation or causal influence when there is none. Saying "Abracadabra" actually has no influence on the result of coin flips. 

Similar chance-mining occurs in quite a few neuroscience papers.  The papers may make quite a few references to neural encoding or neural representation, but they will not be backed up by references to well-designed studies using an adequate sample size.  Typically the paper will present some research that is utterly unreliable for multiple reasons, such as the use of way-too-small study group sizes or unreliable techniques for trying to measure recall in rodents. 

A example of such a paper is the paper here, entitled "Ventral hippocampus neurons encode meal-related memory." The title is unjustified. No robust evidence has been provided of any neural encoding of memory. There are two gigantic flaws in the study:

(1) The study group size is way too small, consisting of only 5 animals. 

(2) No reliable method was used to measure memory performance in rodents. We read that a "foraging-related spatial memory task" apparatus was constructed to test memory in mice. We see a picture of a weird device that the paper does not name. This was not any well-established protocol for testing memory in mice. We fail to have any diagram explaining why such a device would reliably test memory in mice. 

What usually occurs in such papers claiming evidence of "memory encoding" or "memory representation" is that there will be a combination of two main sins, either one of which is to disqualify a paper as good evidence:

(1) Almost always there will be some study group size that is way too-small for any reliable evidence to be honestly claimed 
(2) Usually there will be a reliance on a completely unreliable measurement for estimating fear or recall in rodents, the method of trying to judge "freezing behavior." All papers relying on this method are junk science, for reasons I discuss here. 

bad neuroscience

What largely goes on in such poorly written science papers is pareidolia.  Pareidolia is what occurs when someone keeps scanning some stream of random data, looking for something he can call a representation. An example is a person who eagerly scans his toast every day, looking for some sign of a representation, and who one day announces he has found the face of Jesus in his toast, or maybe the face of the Virgin Mary, or maybe the face of his dead wife. 

pareidolia

The neuroscientist eagerly scanning brain scan data or brain wave data looking for something he can call a little bit of "representation" or "encoding" is someone who we can no more trust than someone eagerly scanning the clouds every day, looking for something that looks like the shape of an animal. 

An example from 2025 of a pure pareidolia paper is the junk science paper "Movie-watching evokes ripple-like activity within events and at event boundaries." We have scientists looking at EEG readings obtained in ten epilepsy patients while the patients watched movies.  Looking at the ever-changing line squiggles that are EEG readings, the authors claim to have seen "ripples" that they claim occur more often during "event boundaries." The claim that there are such "ripples" in the data is as much see-what-you-want-to-see pareidolia as the claim that there are particular points in movies that are "event boundaries." The supposed identification of these "ripples" occurred not by humans staring at the EEG readings, but by some computer program which is a black box of convoluted spaghetti code. Computer programming is the best friend of the scientist trying to see things that are not really there. You can run some computer program that is supposedly seeking some obscure thing in noisy data; and if the first analysis run fails, you can keep tweaking the code until it reports finding what you were hoping to find. 


Monday, September 21, 2026

Neurons Are Just as Active During Sleep, Contrary to "Brains Make Minds" Claims

Under the assumption that the brain produces thinking, we would expect that neurons would fire much more often when a person is awake than when he was asleep. The reality is a very embarrassing one for "brains make minds" claimants. The reality is that neurons are continually active, firing between about 1 to 200 times per second. This activity continues full-blast during sleep, without any major decrease in the firing rates of neurons. Asking Google "what kind of diurnal variations are there in neural firing rates?" I get an AI overview answer that includes this statement referring to neurons: "the average firing rates of excitatory pyramidal populations (such as in the hippocampus) remain remarkably static and stable across the 24-hour period, independent of sleep states."

The graph below is from the scientific paper here, entitled "Neuronal firing rates diverge during REM and homogenize during non-REM." We see neural firing rates in the hippocampus of rats during short periods of rapid-eye movement (REM) sleep, during long periods of non-rapid-eye-movement (NREM) sleep (shown underneath the blue bars), and during some short periods of being awake (shown underneath the orange bars). The firing rates all look the same.

neural firing rates sleep and awake

The same paper gives us this graph showing neuron firing rates in the cortex. We see neural firing rates in the cortex during short periods of rapid-eye movement (REM) sleep (shown underneath the short purple bars), during long periods of non-rapid-eye-movement (NREM) sleep (shown underneath the blue bars), and during some short periods of being awake (shown underneath the orange bars). The firing rates look pretty much the same in sleep and wakefulness. The highest spikes occur not during wakefulness but during REM sleep. 

The graph below (from the paper here) shows no appreciable difference between neural firing rates of awake rats and neural firing rates of asleep rats. The "hz" on the side stands for "hertz," and 1 hertz means I time per second. In both asleep rats and awake rats, neurons firing at an average rate of about 1 time per second, 

neural firing rates, awake and asleep

Below is a graph from the scientific paper here, entitled "Increased neuronal firing in resting and sleep in areas of the macaque medial prefrontal cortex." We see neural firing rates in a monkey during sleep (the shaded areas) and during an awake state. The neurons are firing more frequently during sleep than during the wake state. 

neural firing rates during sleep and wakefulness

This data makes no sense under the idea that your brain makes your mind and the idea that your brain stores your memories. Why would the hippocampus (claimed wrongly to be "the memory center" of the brain) keep firing its neurons at the same rate when you are awake (and need to be continually creating memories) as when you are asleep (when you  are not creating important memories, are not receiving sensory inputs and you are not thinking)? Why would the cortex (wrongly claimed to be the "thinking center" of your brain) fire its neurons more often during sleep (when someone is not thinking) than during wakefulness?