Friday, October 29, 2021

Panpsychism Arguments Involve an Equivocation Fallacy

One of the main type of argumentative fallacies is what is called the equivocation fallacy. A web page states, "The fallacy of equivocation occurs when a key term or phrase in an argument is used in an ambiguous way, with one meaning in one portion of the argument and then another meaning in another portion of the argument."  Below is an example of an argument that uses the fallacy of equivocation. 

"Cosmologists say there is dark matter in space, and we should believe them.  The undeniable fact that dark matter exists is shown by the fact that geologists have found many dark rocks, and the fact that there are many people with dark skin in Africa.  Since we clearly have seen many examples of dark matter such as tar, coal, ebony and dark-skinned Africans, we should not doubt cosmologists when they talk about the reality of dark matter."

What cosmologists refer to dark matter they are referring to a hypothetical invisible non-atomic substance in space. In this example the equivocation fallacy occurs because "dark matter" is used to refer to totally different things.  When the argument refers to the dark matter in "tar, coal, ebony and dark-skinned Africans," the argument is referring to normal visible atomic matter.  But in the first and last sentence the argument is referring to the dark matter referenced by cosmologists, which is something totally different, an invisible non-atomic matter.  The existence of normal, visible, atomic matter that is dark does nothing to support the existence of the "dark matter" postulated by cosmologists, which is invisible non-atomic matter. 

Here is another example of the fallacy of equivocation:

"Cosmologists say that at the beginning the universe underwent inflation, and we should believe them.  Anyone paying attention to how prices are rising must concede that inflation is real."

The "inflation" referred to in the first sentence is the hypothesis that the universe had the briefest phase of exponential expansion. The inflation referred to in the second sentence is a rise in prices. The second type of inflation does nothing to establish the first. 

Arguments for panpsychism typically involve a fallacy of equivocation like the ones we have just seen.  A typical argument for panpsychism goes like this:

"It could be that every lifeless thing has consciousness, even tiny little particles. This might help explain human  consciousness."

The argument uses the word "consciousness" in two different ways, to refer to things as different as the sun and a ray of sunlight. An argument like this is being made by a professor hypothesizing that subatomic particles such as electrons have consciousness. But what exactly is imagined when such a hypothesis is suggested? Is the person arguing that electrons have their own little electron selves? No, such a suggestion would be too laughable. Is the person arguing that electrons have their own little electron lives?  No, such a suggestion would be too laughable. Is the person arguing that electrons are aware of anything? It seems not, since electrons lack any sensory organs, and presumably lack any ESP or clairvoyance that would allow them to observe anything or discover facts without having senses.  Is the person arguing that electrons understand anything or have thoughts? That would be ridiculous. How could an electron that always lacked any sensory organs and never learned any language ever have a thought about anything, or ever understand anything? 

It seems that when this professor is hypothesizing that electrons have consciousness, what he really means to suggest is that maybe electrons have merely the slightest shadow of consciousness, a kind of millionth of a mind.  If the professor were to present his argument without committing the fallacy of equivocation by using the word "consciousness" in two vastly different ways, the argument would sound like this:

"It could be that every lifeless thing has the slightest shadow of consciousness, a kind of millionth of a mind, even tiny little particles. This might help explain human consciousness."

Now the argument is presented without committing the fallacy of equivocation.  But now the argument stands before us naked, and we can see that it has no force. The human mind is an incredibly rich and multi-faceted reality with very many extremely complex and impressive capabilities (many of which our philosophy and biology and psychology professors have deplorably failed to study because of all their senseless taboos that cause them to ignore many important parts of human experience).  The human mind is so rich in capabilities that the practice of referring to it as merely "consciousness" (a word we might use for an insect's mind) is a speech sin that is like trying to make a molehill out of a mountain. We do nothing to explain the stunning multi-faceted richness of the human mind by imagining that particles in a body have "the slightest shadow of consciousness" or "a millionth of a mind." 

What if a panpsychist were to actually assert what I dismissed above as "laughable," and claim that each electron has its own tiny electron life, and that each proton has its own tiny proton life? Such claims would be more "bottom-up baloney" worthless in explaining the human mind.  If my brain consisted of trillions of electrons having the experience of being an electron and trillions of protons having the very different experience of being a proton,  such trillions of diverse microscopic experiences would never add up to the radically different experience of being a human being.  

Postscript: In a book dealing with the philosophy of mind, J. P. Moreland discussses an objection to panpsychism just like the one in the paragraph above, which he describes like this:

"Combination Problem—Sub-minds, such as those of atoms, cannot be conceived to combine or sum into complex, unified minds such as humans have. Hence, panpsychism is not an adequate account of mind."

A few pages later he says this about this Combination Problem: "I take this to be the Achilles heel of panpsychism." He discusses some attempts to evade the problem, none of which are credible. 

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