Sunday, August 28, 2022

Longtermism Is Fueled by a Goofy Belief in Computer-Generated Lives

Reeently I have started to read more and more articles discussing a philosophy called longtermism. I can distinguish between two different versions of longtermism: 

(1) What we may call reasonable-sounding longtermism, in which longtermism is defined as something like the belief that future people matter as much as currently living people. A philosopher named William MacAskill defines longtermism as "the view that positively influencing the longterm future is a key moral priority of our time." A recent New York Times guest essay by the same person is entitled "The Case for Longtermism." What we read about sounds pretty reasonable. No mention is made of interstellar colonization or computer-simulated lives. MacAskill's essay has a moral tone. 

(2) A far more imaginative form of longtermism, what we may call sci-fi longtermism. This version is based on extremely far-out speculations, some of which are very goofy. The speculations seem like outgrowths of the hazardous  speculations of Nick Bostrom, the father of the morally destructive "simulation hypothesis," that we humans are living in a computer simulation created by extraterrestrials.

Let me explain why Bostrom's simulation hypothesis is morally destructive, and how it evolved into sci-fi longtermism.  Bostrom's simulation hypothesis was based on the idea that human conscious experience such as you and I are now having can be generated by computers. There was never any warrant for this speculation. While human experience can be influenced by computers generating visual content that humans interact with, there has never been the slightest shred of evidence that a computer is capable of generating conscious experience like humans have. The idea that a computer can generate conscious experience has always been as silly as the idea that your TV set can not merely show you dinosaur images, but also generate dinosaurs, so that physical dangerous dinosaurs leap out from your TV screen. 

Despite a lack of any warrant for the claim that computers can generate conscious experience, Bostrom advanced the simulation hypothesis, speculating that maybe all of our lives are produced by some computer simulation. But how could we be part of such a simulation, when no computer known to man has ever produced a speck of anything like conscious experience? Bostrom's answer was that maybe the computers generating our conscious experience are produced by super-advanced extraterrestrial civilizations that originated eons ago. 

Many people warmed up to this idea, but I think very few of them realized how morally perilous such a speculation is. The moral hazards of believing in this simulation theory seem almost as bad as the moral hazards of believing in solipsism, the idea that your mind is the only mind in the universe. If your life was merely something produced in some computer of an extraterrestrial civilization, there is no reason we can think of why such extraterrestrials would tend to arrange things so that every person you saw in your conscious experience would actually be a conscious person. It would be much easier to just arrange some simulation so that human bodies appearing in a simulation might be imaginary constructs (like in video games) without corresponding minds.  

When I play Star Wars: Battlefront II on my Playstation 4, as I am very enjoyably doing these days, I can destroy as many shiny white imperial stormtroopers as I want, without any moral feelings, thinking, "They're just detailed shapes in the simulation." And anyone believing that his life is just some computer simulation produced by extraterrestrials might without guilt kill people, thinking, "They're just detailed shapes in the simulation." 

So once a person believes in some simulation hypothesis, he may feel free to maim, rape, steal and kill as much as he wants, while thinking, "I didn't really harm anyone, because they were just human shapes generated by the computer simulation in which I'm living." Bostrom's simulation hypothesis was a form of poisonous nonsense. A good rule to follow is: never leave your children or your money or your property in the hands of someone believing in Bostrom's simulation hypothesis, because such a person's moral behavior is unpredictable. For example, such a person might harm your money or your children or your property in any way that pleases him, while thinking, "These are just shapes being generated by the computer simulation set up by extraterrestrials." 

How does the simulation hypothesis relate to sci-fi longtermism? The proponents of sci-fi longtermism do not as a rule believe that we humans are now living in a computer simulation created by extraterrestrials. But proponents of sci-fi longtermism tend to maintain that in the far future humans will be able to create "computer-simulated lives" rather in the way that Bostrom imagined extraterrestrials doing.

What is going on is that these proponents of sci-fi longtermism are imagining scenarios under which humans spread throughout the galaxy, while setting up computer servers all over the galaxy dedicated to generating computer-generated lives.  We read about this in an article entitled "Against Longtermism" by Emile P. Torrez. He says this:

"This is why longtermists are obsessed with calculating how many people could exist in the future if we were to colonise space and create vast computer simulations around stars in which unfathomably huge numbers of people live net-positive lives in virtual-reality environments. I already mentioned Bostrom’s estimate of 1054 future people, which includes many of these ‘digital people’, but in his bestseller Superintelligence (2014) he puts the number even higher at 1058 people, nearly all of whom would ‘live rich and happy lives while interacting with one another in virtual environments’. Greaves and MacAskill are similarly excited about this possibility, estimating that some 1045 conscious beings in computer simulations could exist within the Milky Way alone. That is what our ‘vast and glorious’ potential consists of: massive numbers of technologically enhanced digital posthumans inside huge computer simulations spread throughout our future light cone. It is for this goal that, in Häggström’s scenario, a longtermist politician would annihilate Germany. It is for this goal that we must not ‘fritter … away’ our resources on such things as solving global poverty. It is for this goal that we should consider implementing a global surveillance system, keep pre-emptive war on the table, and focus more on superintelligent machines than saving people in the Global South from the devastating effects of climate change (mostly caused by the Global North). In fact, Beckstead has even argued that, for the sake of attaining this goal, we should actually prioritise the lives of people in rich countries over those in poor countries, since influencing the long-term future is of ‘overwhelming importance’, and the former are more likely to influence the long-term future than the latter. "

How could anyone come up with such inflated figures, by estimating a total of  1058 future people? There are currently about 140 million people born per year. Rounding this up to 1 billion per year after assuming large levels of some space colonization, and very optimistically assuming that the human race could survive for a billion years, we can get a very optimistic estimate of  1018 humans living in the future. How are these sci-fi longtermists coming up with an estimate more than 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 times larger, an estimate of  1058 future people? It is by assuming that most of the lives will be computer-generated lives. 

In another article describing sci-fi longtermism, we read this:

"Longtermism is a quasi-religious worldview, influenced by transhumanism and utilitarian ethics, which asserts that there could be so many digital people living in vast computer simulations millions or billions of years in the future that one of our most important moral obligations today is to take actions that ensure as many of these digital people come into existence as possible. In practical terms, that means we must do whatever it takes to survive long enough to colonize space, convert planets into giant computer simulations and create unfathomable numbers of simulated beings. How many simulated beings could there be? According to Nick Bostrom —the Father of longtermism and director of the Future of Humanity Institute — there could be at least 1058 digital people in the future, or a 1 followed by 58 zeros."

This is all very big nonsense. Human conscious experience cannot be generated by computers. The posts of this blog provide the strongest evidence for rejecting all claims that human conscious experience has any material explanation. Neuroscientists are unable to provide credible explanation for how brains could produce any of the main aspects of human experience, things such as:

  • self-hood
  • abstract idea creation
  • appreciation
  • memory formation
  • moral thinking and moral behavior
  • instantaneous memory recall
  • instantaneous creation of permanent new memories
  • memory persistence for as long as 50 years or more
  • refined emotions such as romantic love
  • speaking in a language
  • understanding spoken language
  • creativity
  • insight
  • beliefs
  • intellectual pleasure
  • reading ability
  • writing ability
  • ordinary awareness of surroundings
  • visual perception
  • recognition
  • auditory perception
  • attention
  • fascination and interest
  • the correct recall of large bodies of sequential information (such as when someone playing Hamlet recalls all his lines correctly)
  • eyes-closed visualization
  • extrasensory perception (ESP)
  • dreaming
  • volition
  • out-of-body experiences
Why do we have such experiences and capabilities? Because we are souls. Neither brains nor computers have any ability to create souls or conscious minds. The belief that human beings are souls is well-supported not merely by a study of the low-level facts of neuroscience (which collectively show brains cannot explain minds and memory), but also by innumerable written observations of psychic and paranormal phenomena that distinguished humans have made for more than 200 years (read here for a review of such observations). Advocates of sci-fi longtermism have not adequately studied the neuroscience evidence they should have studied, and have also not studied the extremely abundant evidence for human souls. Such people seem to have been lost in a world of science fiction speculation. Instead of spending so much time pondering what will happen in the Milky Way galaxy during the next billion years, such people should have spent more time studying the full spectrum of what people have reported seeing and experiencing here on planet Earth. 

simulation theory bunk

The idea that something like conscious human experience can arise from a computer is as silly as the idea that squeezing rocks can  produce goblins. Human minds with all their diverse powers and aspects cannot arise from any "bottom up" effect, either neural or mechanical, but we can credibly believe they arise from some "top-down" effect involving a mysterious unfathomable metaphysical source of minds and souls. Such a source may also be involved in the origin of individual human bodies, because the progression from a speck-sized zygote cell at the beginning of pregnancy to the vast hierarchical organization of an adult human body (not at all specified by DNA) is a wonder of origination a thousand miles over the heads of today's scientists. So rather than deluding yourself by thinking that some person you see across the street is merely some detailed shape produced by an extraterrestrial computer simulation, say to yourself: that person is a soul like myself, who I should treat with respect, like all souls. 

Sunday, August 21, 2022

Shrink-Speaking About a Mere "Problem of Consciousness" Is As Wrong As Shrink-Speaking About a Mere "Problem of Human Shape Origination"

A recent paper by a physicist is the latest paper by a mainstream scientist claiming to offer a solution to a "problem of consciousness." After you read the title ("A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness") you should chuckle. The term "relativistic" refers to Einstein's theory of general relativity and his theory of special relativity, neither of which has anything to do with explaining the arising of human bodies or the arising of human minds.  These two theories have some relevance to whether the universe is habitable, having the kind of physical conditions that are necessary for living beings such as us. But neither the theory of general relativity nor the theory of special relativity has any relevance at all to explaining human minds.  The paper is filled with obscure mathematical equations, which give us a strong clue that the author has done nothing to explain consciousness. You can't math-equation your way to explaining mind. 

At its beginning the author goes through the usual silly talk that occurs at the beginning of such papers. A mere "problem of consciousness" is raised, defined merely as some problem of why humans have conscious experience. There are two gigantic errors that typically occur very quickly in such discussions:

(1) There is an incorrect problem statement, in which it is asked, "How can the brain give rise to consciousness?" We do not know that brains give rise to consciousness, and we have very many strong reasons (discussed on this blog) for disbelieving that brains are the cause of human consciousness, self-hood, thinking, memory recall and memory formation. So no one should be asking some question that pre-supposes a belief that is unproven and dubious. Asking "how can the brain give rise to consciousness" is as inappropriate as asking "how can the moon give rise to schizophrenia?"

(2) Given a huge quantity of mental phenomena that are not currently explained in a credible way by brain activity, it is extremely inappropriate to be raising a mere "problem of consciousness." The problem that should be raised is a much wider "problem of human mentality." The problem of human mentality is the problem of credibly explaining the thirty or forty most interesting types of human mental experiences, human mental characteristics and human mental capabilities. These include things such as these:

  • imagination
  • self-hood
  • abstract idea creation
  • appreciation
  • memory formation
  • moral thinking and moral behavior
  • instantaneous memory recall
  • instantaneous creation of permanent new memories
  • memory persistence for as long as 50 years or more
  • emotions
  • speaking in a language
  • understanding spoken language
  • creativity
  • insight
  • beliefs
  • pleasure
  • pain
  • reading ability
  • writing ability
  • ordinary awareness of surroundings
  • visual perception
  • recognition
  • auditory perception
  • attention
  • fascination and interest
  • the correct recall of large bodies of sequential information (such as when someone playing Hamlet recalls all his lines correctly)
  • eyes-closed visualization
  • extrasensory perception (ESP)
  • dreaming
  • volition
  • out-of-body experiences
  • apparition sightings 
aspects of human mind

Explaining these things is a very big and wide problem that we can call the problem of human mentality origination. It is a huge mistake to try to shrink that problem into some thousand-times smaller problem that you call "the problem of consciousness," and to speak as if it was merely consciousness that needs to be explained. As soon as you start reading a paper that starts out by posing a mere "problem of consciousness," you have a strong reason for suspecting that the paper is not worth reading.  The person posing a mere "problem of consciousness" is like some economist who poses a mere "problem of street traffic obstruction by beggars" rather than posing a much wider "problem of poverty" or a "problem of economic inequality."  

It is all too easy to understand why scientists engage in this kind of shrink-speaking. A "million-kilogram" problem is one that is very hard to credibly solve. But if you can use shrink-speaking to make it sound like the problem is a mere "one kilogram" problem, then maybe you can make people think you have a solution.  For example, the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear weapons is an incredibly hard problem. But if someone tries to shrink the problem down to a mere "excess heat" problem, maybe he can persuade you that he has a solution involving "compensatory cooling." Or if someone tries to shrink the problem of nuclear weapons down to a mere "dust dispersion" problem, then maybe he can persuade you that he has a solution involving "more efficient vacuum cleaning."  Trying to shrink the problem of human mentality down to a mere "problem of consciousness" is as silly as such examples of trying to shrink a problem. 

There is another place in science where we see scientists shrink-speaking in a way that tries to make a "million-kilogram" problem sound like a "one kilogram" problem. That place is developmental biology. Developmental biology has the "million-kilogram" problem of how it is that the simplicity of a speck-sized zygote cell (a fertilized ovum) is able to progress to become the vastly more organized structure of a full human body. This is the problem of the origin of the structure of an adult human being. It consists of many questions that are currently far beyond the ability of material science to credibly answer. These questions include the following:

(1) How is it that polypeptide sequences (mere chains of amino acids) are able to organize so quickly into the distinctive three-dimensional shapes that are functional protein molecules? We know of about 20,000 different types of human protein molecules (each with its own unique sequence of amino acids), each of which has a distinctive three-dimensional shape. But we do not know what causes such simple sequences of amino acids to form into the three-dimensional shapes needed for protein molecules to be functional. 
(2) How is that 200 different types of incredibly organized human cells are able to originate in the human body, which has DNA that merely contains low-level chemical information, and does not contain any specification of the structure of a cell, or any of its components called organelles?
(3) How is it that cells are able to become organized into the tissues that are needed for humans to live?
(4) How is it that such tissues are able to become organized into the organs that are needed for humans to live?
(5) How is it that organs are able to become part of extremely organized organ systems?
(6) How is it that the exterior structure of the human body is able to arise, with structural features such as the two arms, two legs, ten toes, ten fingers, and one neck?
(7) How is it that there is able to arise the skeletal system consisting of a specific arrangement of 206 bones?
(8) How is it that the incredibly dynamic biochemistry of the human body is able to arise and persist?

DNA gives us none of the answers to these questions. DNA specifies only low-level chemical information. DNA does not specify anatomy. DNA also does not specify the incredibly intricate arrangements necessary for human biochemistry. At the end of the post here, you can read quotes by 20+ biology experts telling us in various ways that it is untrue that DNA is a blueprint, program or recipe for building a human.  Even if such a blueprint existed in DNA, it would not explain the origin of adult human bodies, for the simple reason that blueprints don't build things. Blueprints are guides used by intelligent agents that use blueprints to get ideas about how to build things. 

Faced with such mysteries, developmental biologists often try a trick of shrink-speaking. They often try to reduce the "million-kilogram" problem of the origin of structure in a single human body (during the nine months of pregnancy) to a "one kilogram" problem of "the origin of a human shape." Of course, the problem of the arising of an adult human body from a vastly less organized speck-sized zygote is a problem enormously larger than a mere problem of the origination of a human shape. 

There are three general reasons why each one of us is a wonder far beyond the explanation of physical science:
(1)  Physical science has no explanation for the vast amount of organization occurring when a simple one-cell zygote (lacking any anatomy blueprint in its DNA) progresses from such a speck-sized simplicity to the hugely organized state of a human body. 
(2) Physical science has no credible explanation for the appearance of an adult human mind, because such a thing is not credibly explained by the appearance of a brain, for reasons given in the posts of this blog. 
(3) Physical science has no credible explanation for the improbably habitable universe we live in. The chance of a random universe having conditions needed for living things is microscopic. A huge amount of fine-tuning is needed for a universe that can have planets and sun-like stars or any type of long-lived radiant stars. To give one of many examples of precise fine-tuning needed for a habitable universe, were there not a perfect balance between the absolute value of the proton charge and the electron charge (despite protons being 1836 times more massive), with these two numbers being equal to 1 part in a billion billion, stars and planets would not even hold together (for reasons explained by the astronomer Greenstein). Random universes are lifeless and lightless. The only "explanation" physical science has offered is the bad joke that is the claim of a multiverse (that there exists some infinity or near-infinity of universes, each with different conditions). Such an explanation does nothing to explain why we live in a habitable universe. You do not increase the chance of any one universe being habitable by imagining some infinity of universes. Similarly, you do not increase the chance of any one lottery ticket buyer becoming a millionaire in a lottery win if you imagine millions of lottery ticket buyers. 

We may imagine the following conversation between a curious young boy and a distracted mother walking on the street.

Boy: Mommy, who made the clothes I wear? And who made the TV shows I watch? And who made the cars I see? And who made the street lights?

Mother: The answers are simple, my son. They are: Santa Claus, Santa Claus, Santa Claus, and Santa Claus.

We can also imagine a similar conversation between a philosopher and a neuroscientist.

Philosopher: From whence comes that hint of the transcendent we feel when we look at a sky ablaze with stars? From where do our loftiest ethical principles arise? Why do we lie awake and ponder the weightiest riddles of existence? How do we ever grasp the most abstract notions such as the idea of the universe and the eternal laws of nature?

Neuroscientist: The answers are simple. They are: neurons, neurons, neurons, and neurons.

When we are told such an answer, we are being fooled as badly as the small child is being fooled in the example above. 

Sunday, August 14, 2022

So Much Misleading Talk Occurs in Claims of a Scientific Consensus

These days scientists enjoy a reputation for being honest people, and probably most of them are honest. But it is strange that scientists in general enjoy such a reputation for speaking honestly. Very many scientists are guilty of misleading statements. In the post here I describe some of the many misleading speech patterns of many scientists. In this post I will focus on one of the examples I gave in that post: the misleading use of the term "scientific consensus." Nowadays, this term is being used massively by scientists and science journalists, often in a very misleading way. 

The first thing that should be discussed is: what is meant by the term "consensus"? To get a proper sense of the denotation and connotation of that word, we should look at how "consensus" is defined by various dictionaries. Below is how "consensus" is defined by various dictionaries and authorities:

  • A Google search for "consensus definition" gives "a general agreement" as the first result.
  • The Merriam-Webster dictionary gives us two definitions of "consensus" that disagree with each other. The first definition is "general agreement; unanimity." The second definition is "the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned." The first definition specifies 100%, and the second definition merely means 51% or more. 
  • Dictionary.com also gives us two defintions of "consensus" that disagree with each other. The first is "majority of opinion." The second is "general agreement or concord; harmony." The second definition implies near-unanimity; the first does not. 
  • The Collins dictionary defines "consensus" as "general agreement among a group of people."
  • The Britannica dictionary defines "consensus" as "a general agreement about something : an idea or opinion that is shared by all the people in a group."
  • Vocabulary.com defines "consensus" as "agreement in the judgment or opinion reached by a group as a whole," and at the very beginning of the page with this definition, we are told that  "when there's a consensus, everyone agrees on something."
  • The Cambridge Dictionary defines "consensus" in two ways: (1) "a generally accepted opinion among a group of people"; (2) "agreement among a group of people."
  • The Macmillan dictionary defines "consensus" as "agreement among all the people involved."

From the definitions above, you can make the following conclusions:

(1) "Consensus" is a word that is often defined as if it meant a unanimous opinion on some topic, but also often defined as if it meant a mere majority opinion on some topic.

(2) Because it is often defined as if it meant a unanimous opinion on some topic, "consensus" is undeniably a word with at least a strong connotation of meaning a unanimous opinion on some topic, with everyone agreeing about it.  The connotation of a word is the kind of impression or feeling that the word creates, regardless of how the word is literally defined. 

Because it is defined in ways that conflict with each other, "consensus" is a slippery and ambiguous word to be using. You might call it a very treacherous term, a term very prone to mislead or confuse. Since it has two very different definitions, using the word "consensus" is as potentially misleading as using the word "gay" soon after people first started to use that term to mean "homosexual," at a time when it was hard to tell whether "gay" meant "homosexual" or simply "merry."  

One of many deceptive speech habits occurring in science literature is that misleading claims are being made of a "scientific consensus" about opinions which do not at all involve any unanimity of opinion among scientists. Because of how often "consensus" is defined to mean "unanimty of opinion," such claims are designed to create an impression that scientists agree about something. But typically there is no evidence that anything close to 100% of scientists agree on such an opinion, and in very many cases there is not even good evidence that a strong majority of scientists believe in the opinion. 

Because of the almost total non-existence of secret ballot polls of scientists, there are almost no claims about scientist opinions that are well supported by evidence. We know that certain opinions are what we may call reputed majority opinions of certain types of scientists. For example, it is repeatedly alleged that most cosmologists believe in dark matter and that most biologists believe in the doctrine of common descent, that all species are descended from a common ancestor. But what percentage of cosmologists believe in dark matter, and what percent of biologists believe in the doctrine of common descent? 

You cannot tell such a thing by asking for a show of hands at a meeting of cosmologists or a show of hands at a meeting of biologists. When there is a reputed majority of opinion about something in some scientific field, a scientist in that field may think that he will get in trouble by publicly stating an opinion contrary to the majority in his field.  So such a scientist may fail to honestly state his opinion whenever he can be publicly identified as someone holding a contrarian opinion. 

You can try to figure out what scientists think about a hypothesis by going through their public statements, but that would be a not-very-reliable approach.  Publicly scientists will often make statements that do not show a definite belief about something.  For exampe, having read innumerable scientific papers on memory, I know that an extremely common type of statement in such papers is for a neuroscientist to say something like this: "It is commonly maintained that memories are stored in synapses." But what does that tell us about what the author of the paper believes? You cannot tell. 

The only way to get a reliable measure of the opinion of a scientist is to do a secret ballot poll, one that includes a variety of belief options including "I don't know" or "I'm not sure." However, such polls are virtually never done. When opinion polls of scientists are done, they typically fail to be secret ballots, and also fail to offer a full spectrum of answers including options such as  "I don't know" or "I'm not sure."  

Here are some of the main shady tricks of consensus claimants, people trying to make it sound as if scientists agree about topics when there is no good evidence that such agreement exists:

(1) Inappropriate use of the word "consensus": Given the fact that the word "consensus" is so often defined to mean unanimity of opinion (as we saw by the definitions above), anyone who uses the word "consensus" to describe something that is not a unanimity of opinion should be labeled as someone who has written or spoken in a misleading way. 

(2) Making claims of consensus based on dubious interpretations of scientific papers. The classic example of a misleading analysis of this type was the paper (mentioned below) that analyzed public papers on climate change, and tried to make it sound like the papers showed a 97% consensus on a topic when what was really going on was most of the authors stating no opinion on the topic. 

(3) Using shifting or inconsistent definitions when trying to back up claims of consensus.  A classic trick of consensus claimants is to use shifting, inconsistent language while making consensus claims. For example:

  • A Darwinism enthusiast will try to suggest unanimity about evolution by citing some poll suggesting almost all biologists believe that "humans evolve over time." Belief in this very weak claim (disputed by virtually no one) will then be used to make a claim of consensus about an entirely different claim, a much more presumptuous claim, such as a claim of common ancestry of all species or a claim that evolution is the main cause of human origins. 
  • To depict unanimity about climate change, someone may cite some poll asking about "whether global warming is real" or about "whether human activities contribute to global warming," and then use those results to claim a consensus that "human activities are the main cause of global warming," which is a proposition more presumptuous than those two claims, or use those results to claim a consensus that "most of global warming is caused by human activities," which is a proposition even more presumptuous than those two claims.   

language misunderstanding
Consensus claimants often use shady tricks like this

(4) Failing to cite secret ballot polls. A poll of scientists that fails to use a secret ballot technique should not be trusted. If a secret ballot is not used, there will be too large a chance that a scientist will avoid stating a controversial opinion for fear of getting in trouble for defying the reputed norms of his peers. The only reliable way to do an opinion poll of scientists is to do a secret ballot poll, but almost never are such polls done. Unless a poll of scientists specifically claims to have been done using a secret ballot technique, we should always assume no such technique was used. Anyone doubting that scientists would live in fear of getting in trouble by stating unconventional opinions should study my post here, which documents a recent case of a major science journal trying to get a PhD fired because he stated some mildly unconventional opinions in a restrained manner.  
(5) Failing to use polls that offer an "I don't know" or "No Opinion" choice. Opinion polls of scientists that do not offer a choice of "I don't know" or "No opinion" are worthless. So, for example, you do nothing to properly measure scientist opinions on human origins if you offer a choice between "Darwinian natural selection" and "God creating Adam and Eve," and fail to offer a choice such as  "I don't know." 
(6) A misleading use of the phrase "growing consensus," often used for claims not even accepted by a majority of scientists.  One of the many abuses of the word "consensus" occurs when someone makes a claim that there is a "growing consensus" about something, typically referring to some claim that is not even believed by any clear majority. We had an example of this in an article in which a scientist incorrectly claims there is a "growing consensus that spacetime (and thus also matter/energy) is not fundamental but emergent from entangled quantum information." Such an offbeat idea is not held by a majority of scientists or physicists. I may note that every time someone refers to a "growing consensus" they are using the word "consensus" in a way that contradicts one of the definitions of consensus, the definition of agreement or unanimity. If 100% of the people believe in something, such a level of 100% cannot be growing. 
(7) Using subset mining to get a more compelling claim of consensus. Often an attempt to show a unanimity of scientist opinion will fail, with polls showing only something like 80% of scientists agreeing on some topic. Then paper authors will often resort to what we may call subset mining. The goal will be to slice or dice the data until some more compelling claim of consensus can be made. So did your poll of biologists find fewer than 90% of biologists endorsing Darwinian explanation of human origins? Then you can try checking a subset of those biologists: only those calling themselves "evolutionary biologists," and report on how that subset responded. Did your poll of earth scientists find that fewer than 90% of them endorse the claim that global warming is mostly man made? Then you can try checking a subset of such scientists calling themselves "climate scientists," and report on how that subset responded. Do you still have a number not high enough? Then you can get a subset of that subset, reporting on the responses of those who call themselves climate scientists and have also published at least ten papers with "global warming" in their titles.  

One problem with such "subset mining" is that the very terms that scientists use to describe themselves can be an indication of what they believe. So if you select a subset of scientists that calls themselves some particular thing, you may be getting some little clique or faction or tribe that will share some common ideology. Unanimity or near-unanimity in such a small group is not persuasive, and often merely is an indication that a little belief community has formed.  

For example, if rather than polling people calling themselves "biologists" or "ecologists" you poll people who call themselves "evolutionary biologists," it is not too convincing if the great majority endorses conventional Darwinism. Anyone who has decided to call himself an evolutionary biologist is already someone who has declared his allegiance to Darwinist tenets. Similarly, it may be impressive if 90% of physicists were to endorse string theory, but it is not very impressive if 90% of people calling themselves "string theory physicists" endorse string theory. Once a person starts calling himself a string theory physicist, he means he has already endorsed the speculative ideas of string theory. Similarly, it is not necessarily convincing if 97% of people calling themselves "climate scientists" endorse claims that global warming is mostly man made. It could be that the term "climate scientist" is chosen only by those endorsing such claims, with uncertain people calling themselves more general terms such as "earth scientists," "atmospheric scientists," and "meteorologists." 

(8) Bad polling methods relying on voluntary participation. Decades ago I once briefly held two full-time jobs, working for two months as a temporary worker for the US Census Bureau. The US Census Bureau knew the correct way to do a scientific survey. They scientifically selected a certain number of people for polling on one particular topic (how many people use the government's fishing and wildlife services), and then hired workers such as myself to keep calling such people until as many of them as possible answered a series of questions about the topic being researched.  

This produces results much more reliable than a voluntary participation survey (one in which people are mailed a survey form, and may choose to fill out the form or ignore it). There are all kinds of reasons why voluntary participation surveys may produce slanted results. It may be that the people who tend to fill out such voluntary surveys are those who feel most passionately about the topic. But what kind of opinion poll are you getting when you are getting answers from those who feel most passionately about the topic? Possibly some result that does not reflect the opinion of scientists in general. 

Here is a hypothetical example. Let's suppose 90% of scientists don't believe in Theory X, and don't care about it. Then suppose a survey form is mailed to 1000 scientists asking what they think about Theory X. It could be that 90% of the 100 respondents are those who  believe in Theory X, and are interested enough to fill out the survey. The survey might then suggest that 90% of scientists believe in Theory X, even though 90% of them do not believe in it.

The recent paper "Knowledge overconfidence is associated with anti-consensus views on controversial scientific issues" gives us an example of misleading language using the word "consensus." Some of the misleading parts of this paper are listed below:

(1) A groundless claim is made of a scientist consensus that "consuming foods with ingredients derived from GM
crops is no riskier than consuming foods modified by
conventional plant improvement techniques." The only two references given to support this statement are not references to polls of scientists (one of the references being a brash board of directors statement, and the other being a very mixed report that never makes such a claim about genetically modified crops).
(2) We also have the duplicity of switching the definition of evolution, defining it one place as "humans have evolved over time" and defining it another place as "an explanation of human origins."   The claim that evolution adequately explains human origins is a claim vastly more presumptuous than the mere claim that humans have evolved over time. Because gene pools undeniably change over time, almost no one disputes the idea that humans have in some sense evolved over time.

An example of a paper misleadingly using the word "consensus" is the 2021 paper "Consensus revisited: quantifying scientific
agreement on climate change and climate expertise among Earth scientists 10 years later." The study involved a voluntary participation email survey of 10,929 Earth scientists, using a source listing geosciences faculty. 2780 responded, and 7.9% listed "natural processes" as the main cause for global warming, with 91.1% listing "human activity" as the main cause for global warming. The title  misleadingly suggests there is "consensus" and "agreement" among Earth scientists about global warming, but its data does not show that, with about 8% of the respondents giving a response defying such an alleged consensus.

Another example of a paper misleadingly using the word "consensus" is the 2013 paper "Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature."  The paper led to widespread claims that 97% of climate scientists agree that global warming is mostly caused by humans, but it did not find any such thing. Instead, after examining the literature for "11 944 climate abstracts from 1991–2011 matching the topics 'global climate change' or 'global warming' " the study found that 
"66.4% of abstracts expressed no position" on whether global warming was mostly caused by humans, and that of the abstracts that did state a position on this topic, 97.1 endorsed the position that global warming is mostly caused by humans. There is a very large difference between such a finding and a finding that 97% of climate scientists claim that global warming is mostly caused by humans. 

Oddly, there are scientific consensus claims that are utterly inconsistent with statements that are widely made these days by scientists. It has become increasingly common and mainstream for scientists to list a "problem of consciousness" as an unsolved problem. But if we don't know what causes consciousness, then (1) we have no basis for confidence in claims that the brain is the cause of the human mind, and (2) we have no basis for claiming that we understand the origin of the human race. If you don't understand the origin of consciousness, then you have no business claiming that you understand the origin of humans. In this case two of the claimed "consensus opinions" of scientists (the claim that evolution explains human origins and the claim that brains produce minds) turn out to be inconsistent with another claim that scientists are widely making these days (that we do not understand how humans are conscious). 

There have been so many outrageous misstatements by scientists and science writers that used the word "consensus" that I must recommend the general principle that as a rule of thumb you should tend to be suspicious whenever you hear a scientist or science writer making any claim about what scientists believe that uses the word "consensus." The whole idea of appealing to an alleged consensus is a poor one. When people have facts to back up their claims, they cite facts. When they lack adequate facts to back up their claims, they may appeal to some alleged consensus of experts. When we hear appeals to some alleged consensus of scientists, it does not show the claim  is poorly established, but it may be a reason for suspecting such a thing. Nobody ever says there is a consensus of scientists that Jupiter exists. Someone wanting to show that Jupiter exists will show a space probe photo of Jupiter or a telescope photo of Jupiter. 

I was pleased to see that the US Congress recently took action that will reduce US greenhouse gases, and I have lived a very "low carbon" lifestyle for the past ten years (although who knows whether that is being "global warming attentive" or just being a garden-variety cheapskate). Scientists reasonably wishing to provoke public action relating to global warming should appeal to the simple facts that support the probably correct claim that humans are the main cause of global warming, instead of making shaky claims misleadingly suggesting that there is unanimity of opinion among experts on this topic. Knowing that academia tribes are subject to groupthink effects, people are not very persuaded by claims of agreement in some specialized tribe of scientists that may be following a "follow the herd" rule.  Rather than appealing to some agreement in such a tribe, it is better to appeal to facts.  

For reasons given above, you should be extremely suspicious about all claims that there is a scientific consensus that the brain produces the mind, or a consensus that memories are stored in brains. There is no good evidence that all scientists or almost all scientists hold such beliefs. There seems to exist no study doing a secret ballot of the opinions of biologists about such topics.    

If you do a Google search using the phrase "poll of neuroscientists" you will find almost no examples of polls of neuroscientists other than a 2002 study entitled "Do You Know Your Brain? A Survey on Public Neuroscience Literacy at the Closing of the Decade of the Brain." The study did a poll of neuroscientists around the globe, but no claim is made that any attempt at a secret ballot was made. So we should therefore assume that the poll was not a secret ballot. In any poll that was not a secret ballot, scientists may have tended to answer in some way matching perceived conventions, to avoid getting in trouble by stating some opinion contrary to the supposed majority opinion in their field. 

The study's statement about the polling of neuroscientist has an inconsistent sound to it. We read this:

"As a reference against which to compare the public’s responses, 270 regular members of the Society for Neuroscience were consulted via e-mail, with an electronic, English version of the same questionnaire. A total of 2193 filled-in questionnaires were collected, 35 of which were from senior neuroscientists of different nationalities."

But how could 2193 questionnaires be returned, when only 270 were polled? The numbers given here don't sound right. 

The poll gives some evidence that many neuroscientists do not hold the opinions commonly attributed to them. Asked whether they agree with the claim that "memory is stored in the brain much like in a computer, that is, each remembrance goes in a tiny piece of the brain," 82% answered "No," 12% answered "Don't know," and only 6% answered "Yes."  9% answered "Don't know" when asked whether they agree "the mind is a product of the working of the brain." When asked whether they agree with the statement "memory is stored in a net of many cells scattered throughout the brain," 77% said "Yes," 9% said "No," and 14% said "Don't know." When asked whether "'State of mind' is a reflection of the brain state in a given moment," 77% said "Yes," 3% said "No," and 20% said "Don't know." When asked whether they agree with the claim "Without a brain, consciousness is not possible,"  83% answered "Yes," 6% answered "No," and 11% answered "Don't know."  When asked whether they agreed with the claim "the mind is the result of the action of the spirit, or of the soul, on the brain," 35% answered "Don't know."

Although very limited as evidence for what neuroscientists are  thinking (with answers from only 35 senior neuroscientists), this poll is sufficient to show that the beliefs conventionally attributed to neuroscientists are not held by all or almost all neuroscientists.  In general, we lack reliable data on what neuroscientists believe. There seem to be no studies that perform (using scientific polling practices) a secret ballot of neuroscientists asking how much they agree with the beliefs commonly attributed to neuroscientists. So people should not be talking about a "consensus of neuroscientists" regarding the cause of mind or the storage place of memory, particularly since the term "consensus" suggests a unanimity that does not exist.

Let us consider a very interesting type of alleged consensus that I may call a "leader's new clothes" consensus.  Let us imagine a small company of about 20 employees that has a weekly employee meeting every Monday morning. On one Monday morning after all the employees have gathered in a conference room for the meeting, the company's leader comes in wearing flashy new clothes that are both very ugly and ridiculous-looking. Immediately the leader says, "I just paid $900 for this new outfit -- raise your hand if you think I look great in these clothes."   

Now if it is known that the leader is someone who can get angry and fire people for slight offenses, it is quite possible that all twenty of the employees might raise their hand in such a situation, even though not one single one of them believes that the leader looks good in his ugly new clothes.  In such a case the "public consensus" is 100% different from the private consensus. A secret ballot would have revealed the discrepancy. 

The point of this example is that appeals to some alleged public consensus are notoriously unreliable. So arguing from some alleged consensus of some group is a weak and unreliable form of reasoning.  The only way to get a reliable measure of the opinion of people on something is to do a secret ballot, and there virtually never occurs secret ballots of scientists asking about their opinions on scientific matters. We have no idea of whether the private beliefs of scientists differ very much from the public facade they present.  For example, we have no idea whether it is actually true that almost all  scientists think your mind is merely the product of your brain. It could easily be that 35% of them doubt such a doctrine, but speak differently in public for the sake of "fitting in," avoiding "heresy trouble" and seeming to conform to the perceived norms of their social group. 

Two very simple rules scientists should follow are (1) don't claim you understand something that you don't understand; (2) don't claim or insinuate that scientists all agree on something when you lack any good evidence that such agreement exists. Nature is very, very complex, and gives up its secrets very, very slowly, often eventually making knowledge boasts of scientists look ridiculous. 

For more on this topic, see my post here, entitled "Exaggerations Abound When People Talk About a Scientific Consensus."

Sunday, August 7, 2022

They're Calling It a Huge Memory Research Fraud, But Is It Only the Tip of the Iceberg?

If you do a Google search using the phrase "memory research fraud," you will now get many recent results from leading news sources, including results such as these:

The leading journal Science did a big six-month investigation resulting in a recent long article entitled "Blots on a Field?" We hear claims of doctored images and fake visuals. An interesting part of the story is where the journal Science reaches out to leading science journals that have allegedly published some fake research, such as Nature and the Journal of Neuroscience, getting a lot of "no comments" from such journals. 

We read this in one news article:

"Dr Bik has now identified 14 other studies...that also appear suspicious. Despite this, in the majority of cases, no action has been taken against the journals that published them. The University of Minnesota declined a request to comment by The Mail on Sunday...Richard Smith, a former editor-in-chief of the British Medical Journal (BMJ), who has warned that research fraud is a ‘major threat to public health’, said that the case was ‘shocking but not surprising’.  He cites research that suggests up to one in five of the estimated two million medical studies published each year could contain invented or plagiarised results, details of patients who never existed and trials that did not actually take place. He adds the problem is ‘well known about’ in science circles, yet there is a reluctance within the establishment to accept the scale of the problem."

The same Dr. Bik is quoted as saying, "’I've flagged more than 6,000 studies as potentially fraudulent, but just one in six have been retracted by publishers." Later in the same article we read this:

"At present there are no drugs that can fight Alzheimer’s. The first company to invent one would no doubt have a billion-dollar blockbuster on its hands – and this, says Adrian Heilbut, has incentivised misconduct."

We can imagine part of the motivation here:
(1) Invest money in company XYZ.
(2) Do a "fair means or foul" paper suggesting that company XYZ's approach towards treating Alzheimer's is promising. 
(3) Watch your stock shares soar in value. 

The items discussed above are only "the tip of the iceberg." The problem in memory research is ten times worse than the mere problem of some researchers doing image doctoring to produce frauduent images. The problem that is ten times worse involves things like this:

(1) Scientific papers are routinely stating claims in their titles and abstracts that are not well-established by any observations reported in the papers.
(2) Such unfounded claims are being massively repeated in the uncritical "echo chamber" that is the mainstream press and body of web sites calling themselves "science news" sites. 
(3) Scientists doing experiments involving memory typically use study group sizes that are too small to produce any reliable result. The results are mainly false alarms of a type that can easily arise when too-small study group sizes are used. 
(4) Scientists doing experiments involving memory typically fail to do the sample size calculations that would alert them that the study group sizes they are using are way too small to produce a reliable result. 
(5) Scientists doing experiments involving memory are very often using defective experimental procedures that produce unreliable results, such as trying to measure fear in rodents by subjectively judging "freezing behavior" rather than using better procedures producing more reliable results, such as trying to measure fear in rodents by measuring heart rate (which reliably spikes very sharply when a rodent is afraid). 
(6) Scientists doing experiments involving memory routinely fail to follow a blinding protocol that would reduce the chance of them producing false-alarm results in which they merely "see what they want to see." 
(7)  Scientists doing experiments involving memory routinely fail to follow good practices by pre-registering an exact experimental method for collecting and analyzing data. Often their papers show strong signs of "keep torturing the data until it confesses," which can also be described as "keep slicing and dicing the data until you find something like you hoped to find." 

The diagram below illustrates some of what is going on. The "picking random cells" refers to memory experiments in which some learning occurs, and then scientists attempt to show neural changes resulting from learning after randomly picking some cells for analysis, ignoring the extreme improbability that randomly selected cells would have changed because of such learning. Because of constant remodeling and molecular turnover occurring theoughout the brain, randomly selected cells or synapses will be likely to show changes that were not produced by learning.  

bad science


The links at the top of this blog refer to a scandal involving misleading images in neuroscience papers. Something similar has gone on endless times in brain imaging studies on the neural correlates of consciousness. Again and again, such studies will show visuals that depict differences of only 1% or smaller between brain activity in different small regions of the brain. But such regions will be shown as red regions in brain images, with all of the other areas having a grayish “black and white” color. When you see such an image, you inevitably get the impression that the highlighted part of the brain has much higher activity than other regions. But such a conclusion is not what the data is showing.

So, for example, a study finding merely 1% higher brain activity in a region near the corpus callosum (under some activity that we may call Activity X) might release a very misleading image looking like the image below, in which the area of 1% greater activity is colored in red.

 
 
But such an image is lying with colors. If there is only a 1% greater activity in this region, an honest diagram would look like the one below. 

 
With this diagram, the same region shown in red in the first diagram is shown as only 1% darker. You can't actually tell by looking at the diagram which region has the 1% greater activity when Activity X occurs. But that's no problem. The diagram above leaves the reader with the correct story: none of the brain regions differ in activity by more than 1% when Activity X occurs. Contrast this with the first image, which creates the very misleading idea that one part of the brain is much more active than the others when Activity X occurs.

You might complain that with such a visual, you cannot tell which regions have the slightly greater activity. But there are various ways to highlight particular regions of a brain visual, such as circling, pointing arrows, outlining, and so forth. For example, the following shows a region of very slightly higher activity without misleading the viewer by creating the impression of much higher activity:
 
The misleading diagrams of brain imaging studies seem all the more appalling when you consider that the images in such studies are typically the only thing that laymen use to form an opinion about localization in the brain. The text of brain imaging studies is typically written in thick jargon that only a neuroscientist can understand. Frustrated by this very hard-to-understand jargon and unclear writing, every layman reading these studies forms his opinions based on the visuals. When such visuals deceive us by lying with colors (as they so often do), it is a scandal of visual misrepresentation as great as whatever is discussed in the links at the top of this post.