Sunday, November 23, 2025

More Old Newspaper Stories Relevant to Whether Brains Make Minds

The Chronicling America web site allows you to make a full-text search of many decades of American newspapers. Below are some interesting clips from old newspaper articles, all having some relevance to whether the human brain makes the human mind.  

The news account below is from 1957:

right hemispherectomy

You can read the report here:


The account below is from the nineteenth century. We hear of a man who apparently did not suffer intellectual damage from losing half of his brain. 

small effect of brain injury

You can read the 1876 account here:


The newspaper account below is from 1898:

good minds and bad brains


You can read the story here:


Using an OCR feature of the page above, I get this quotation of its middle part:

"In instances in which it was discovered after death that the connecting bridge between the hemispheres
was entirely wanting, neither derangement in intellect was observed, nor any other abnormality of life in the way of movement or sensation. Thus, in the notable case of Bichat, one of the foremost anatomists of his day, one lobe of his brain was found markedly smaller than the other. He was, in fact, deficient in one-half of his brain, and yet his mental and physical life was in its way notably of a high order. In another case, reported by Cruveilhier, a man died in the hospital at the age of 42 years from heart disease. He exhibited no lack of intelligence, yet after his death it was discovered that his left brain was practically destroyed and replaced by a watery substance. Another case, reported by Andral, was of a man who died at the age of 2S. He had suffered from a fall when three years old, and as a result was paralyzed on his left side. The right half of his brain had practically disappeared, so that the parts below this half constituted the floor for an empty space. Andral says of this
man that he 'had received a good education, and had profited by it; he had a good. memory; his speech was free and easy; his intelligence was such as we should expect to find in an ordinary man.' "

Below is a news story from 1938. We read of a girl "with half a brain" who carried on in a "remarkably satisfactory manner":

good mind with half a brain

You can read the news story here:


We have below a report that is not at all what we would expect if the brain produces the mind.  The report is of patients who underwent surgeries that surgically severed the two halves of their brain. But instead of this producing a drastically different mind, or two minds, we have apparently minimal effects:

split brain operation

You can read the story using this link:


The 1905 newspaper account below tells us of a man who seemed to have suffered little mental damage from losing most of his brain:


You can read the account here:


Here is a news account from 1987 telling us of a big improvement in reading ability after half of a girl's brain was removed. 


little damage from loss of half of brain

You can read the full story here:


A fact contrary to all claims that brains make minds is the fact that very severe pain can be completely cancelled by the use of hypnosis. Below is a news story documenting the effect. 

hypnotism preventing pain during surgery

On pages 27-28 of a book by Dr. James Esdaile he lists a host of dramatic painless surgeries he performed without using anesthesia, but only hypnosis on patients. The list includes about 20 amputations, and 200 removals of scrotal tumors ranging from 10 pounds in weight to more than 100 pounds in weight. Another book on this topic by Esdaile can be read here

In the following quote from a nineteenth century work, we learn of a great irony: that physicians took up a chemical method of anesthesia, one which would often kill people, rather than using hypnotic methods of anesthesia that were proving very safe and effective:

"In Dr. Brown Sequard's lectures upon 'Nervous Force,' delivered in Boston in 1874, he speaks of this form of anaesthesia as follows : 

'As regards the power of producing anaesthesia, it seems to me unfortunate that the discovery of ether was made just when it was. It was, as you well know, in 1846 or 1847 that the use of ether as an anaesthetic was begun. It started from this city (Boston). At that time in England, Dr. Forbes was trying to show from facts observed in England, and especially in India, from the practice of Dr. Esdaile, that something which was called Mesmerism, but which, after all, was nothing but a peculiar state of somnambulism induced in patients, gave to them the idea that they were deprived of feeling ; so that they were in reality under the influence of their imagination, and operations were performed that were quite painless. I say that it was a pity that ether was introduced just then, as it prevented the progress of our knowledge as to this method of producing anaesthesia. My friend Dr. Broca took it up in 1857-8 and pushed it very far; and for a time it was the fashion in Paris to have amputations performed after having been anaesthetized by the influence of Braidism or Hypnotism. A great many operations were performed in that way that were quite painless. But it was a process that was long and tedious, and surgeons were in a hurry and gave it up. I regret it very much, as there has never been a case of death from that method of producing anesthesia, while you well know that a great many cases of death have been produced by other methods.' "

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Junk and Gems at the Essentia Foundation Site

 An organization called the Essentia Foundation has a web site that tries to create a contrarian vibe, with some kind-of-rebellious sounding phrases occurring here and there. On an About Us page, we read this

"Essentia Foundation aims at communicating, in an accurate yet accessible way, the latest analytic and scientific indications that metaphysical materialism is fundamentally flawed. Indeed, clear reasoning and the evidence at hand indicate that metaphysical idealism or nondualism—the notion that nature is essentially mental—is the best explanatory model we currently have."

That sounds quite rebellious, although I think what we get from the site is mainly not much of a rebellion at all. What we get is mainly a promotion of a naturalist, atheist worldview (Bernardo Kastrup's "analytic idealism") that has little practical difference from the worldview of materialists (although there are quite a few superficial soundbite differences). The site seems to be devoted to promoting an outlook sometimes called analytic idealism, although it should be more accurately described as atheist idealism or atheistic immaterialism. 

Idealism (the philosophical viewpoint that only minds and their experiences exist) is a viewpoint that has been presented in a surprising credible form, in a theistic version. To someone who is not used to thinking as an idealist, idealism may initially seem absurd. But the case for idealism was advanced in a surprisingly forceful way in the eighteenth century, by British philosopher George Berkeley. In his classic philosophical work The Principles of Human Knowledge (which can be read here), Berkeley argued for immaterialism, the idea that matter has no existence outside of minds that perceive matter. 

idealism

Being a person who denies the reality of matter, an idealist needs to have a credible answer  to the question of why people report identical experiences of observing physical things that don't really exist according to the idealist.  For example, why do you and me and all of our relatives always have the same experience seeing a bright yellow thing in the sky during the day, and a bright white thing in the sky during the night? For a materialist or a dualist the answer is easy: because the sun really physically exists, and the moon really physically exists. But for the idealist who does not believe in the physical existence of the sun or the moon, this uniformity of observations is a problem. 

Berkeley got around this problem by imagining a divine reality (God) that causes such uniformity of perceptual experiences. So, according to Berkeley, when we look up at the sky and see the sun fairly often, it is not because there exists a physical sun independent of minds; it is instead because a divine mind is causing such perceptual regularities in our mind.

But idealism has never been credibly presented in an atheistic form.  An atheist idealist can have no credible answer to questions such as "Why would I keep seeing the sun every month, if the sun does not physically exist?"

Let us look at some of the articles on the Essentia Foundation's website (many more can be read here).
  • "Post-materialist cognitive science: Is it viable?"  The article fails to give any of the better reasons for rejecting physicalism.  
  • "An unfelt surprise upon being uploaded into the cloud." We get an article by Christof Koch, who has been involved in faulty attempts to explain away near-death experiences as brain activity (as I describe here). He sounds skeptical about uploading minds into computers, but fails to mention the better reasons for rejecting such a possibility. 
  • "The cell membrane as the ‘missing link’ for the evolution of consciousness." The essay seems like something a conventional "brains make minds" materialist would write. 
  • "Has experimental psychology proven that consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function?"  There's nothing challenging "brains make minds" orthodoxy here. 
  • "Psychedelics, the self, and the collapse of materialist assumptions." We hear some discussion of people having profound or remarkable experiences while taking psychedelics. The author then states, "These findings support the notion that consciousness is not generated by the brain but accessed through it or even embodied in all of us," without really supporting such a statement. There are very many reasons for rejecting "brains make minds" dogma, but the author has failed to give any of the stronger ones. 
  • "NDEs and existential angst."  Near-death experiences are an important line of evidence against "brains make minds" ideology, when discussed well. Here the article fails to well-describe the phenomenon, giving a distorted discussion of it. 
  •  "Analytic Idealism and the possibility of a meta-conscious cosmic mind." This is one of the better articles at the site, but only because it helps to illuminate that Bernardo Kastrup's "analytic idealism" is a metaphysically impoverished affair that is really just atheism in new clothing, a kind of metaphysical dress. The author tells us that Kastrup "has stated in many places that universal consciousness is most likely not meta-conscious and that, in this sense, does not entail any personal, intentional, or self-aware aspect at its most fundamental level," and suggests we need something much more.  Given how badly brains fail to explain minds and how badly Darwinism fails to explain the wonders of biology and cosmic fine-tuning, it seems that what we need to explain the ingenious design of our universe and the wonders of human bodies and human minds is something like a super-intelligent, purposeful and vastly powerful mind, not merely  some so-called "universal consciousness" lacking any intention or self-awareness.  
  • "The social pay off of idealism."  The article furthers my suspicion that what the Essentia Foundation is mainly promoting is atheism in metaphysical dress, because the author speaks with seeming contempt while mentioning "gods and spirits,"  and makes clear that he does not believe in "anything supernatural." 
  • "Freedom from free will: Good riddance to the self" is a very bad essay engaging in the atrocious error of free will denialism, which is the worst type of denialism. The writer presents this nonsense as the "editorial position" of the Essentia Foundation run by Kastrup. We read this: "From a mental health perspective, while for a protagonist personality acceptance of no free will is a welcome cooling of passions, it may not seem beneficial for all. But what it points to is something that does have the potential to ease suffering for all: the absence of a self."  This is the worst type of nonsense, delusion and falsehood. Each of us is a self, and we do have free will. So now it is rather clear that we should not have any great confidence in the teachings of the Essentia Foundation. 
  • "The broad horizons of Ecstatic Naturalism" sells atheism with some happy-face twist. The essay deepens my suspicion that the Essentia Foundation is mainly dedicated to selling atheism in new clothes, a kind of metaphysical garb. 
  • "The science of consciousness after death." Contradicting some of the essays above, this author says the evidence for life after death is very strong, and discusses some of it. 
  • "In defense of Integrated Information Theory (IIT)" by Bernardo Kastrup is strangely a defense of a  "brains-make-minds" theory favored by materialists. We have an additional reason for suspecting that Kastrup's "analytic idealism" is just atheism in a little metaphysical dressing. 
  • "Materialism in academia is a fundamentalist belief system." This good essay is by a cognitive scientist with some insight as to how the materialist culture within academia is like the culture of an organized religion. Courageously, the scientist discusses her experience with a phenomena sometimes called after-death communication or ADC. She states this: "In October of 2019 I ‘lost’ a dearest friend and colleague to suicide. Just after his passing, I started experiencing what were very unusual phenomena for me. Vivid dreams full of information I didn’t know before, messages, significant signs and feelings, none of which I could explain but somehow knew were given to me from my friend."  Another similar essay by the same cognitive scientist is here, one worth reading. 
  • "The red herring of free will in objective idealism." More appalling nonsense denying or belittling free will, this time from Bernardo Kastrup, the director of the Essentia Foundation, who makes the false-as-false-can-be claim that "the very idea of free will turns out to be empty, semantically void." 
  • "Experience requires no personal self." Here we have more very bad nonsense involving denial of the self.
  • "Near-Death Experiences during cardiac arrest."  This is a good overview of important research on near-death experiences, by an important researcher in this field. Often involving reports of people viewing their bodies from outside their bodies, near-death experiences are actually suggestive of dualism (that you have a mind or soul different from your body), rather than idealism. Contrary to the denial of selfhood nonsense in some of the articles above, near-death experiences suggest that you do have a self, and one that survives death. 
  • 'How Can You Be Me? The Answer Is Time." Some very bad nonsense here, in which Bernardo Kastrup claims that "you are me, at the same time that you are yourself"  and that "when you talk to another person, that other person is just you in  a ‘parallel timeline.' "  Oops to the second power. 
Overall my impressions reading the posts at this site agree with the impression I got earlier that Bernardo Kastrup's "analytic idealism" is a bit of a wolf-in-sheep's-clothing type of thing:  a form of atheism dressed up in metaphysical garb, possibly to attract some people repelled by the unbelievable standard sales pitches of atheists. It is a huge mistake to be describing human minds (involving such an enormously rich diversity of capabilities)  and human mental experiences (involving so many different types of phenomena vastly greater than mere awareness) by using the shadow-speaking term "consciousness," and to then think that the human mind can be explained by postulating some mere "universal consciousness" lacking in intention or intelligence or self-awareness. 

Very much an "armchair reasoning" affair apparently not mainly inspired by observations, Kastrup's "analytic idealism" involves the strange business of denying that there's matter, and postulating that all that exists are minds like ours or minds of other planetary creatures. You might call it atheism without physical matter. Under his scheme the term "universal consciousness" is used apparently as just a term meaning the collection of all minds like human minds. Humans are described as fragments or "alters" of this universal consciousness. 

To try to make his strange philosophy work, Kastrup is forced into depicting a human being as a mere shadow of what a human being is.  This involves the foolishness of denial of the self and the foolishness of denial of free will. Kastrup twists himself into knots trying to make this scheme work, making patently untrue statements such as "desire is necessity, and necessity is desire," and referring to "the egomaniacal delusion of individual agency." Such statements by Kastrup are bad examples of nonsense and falsehood.

We have an example of Kastrup's way-wrong shadow-speaking in this quote by him

"Under objective idealism, however, subjectivity is the foundation of reality; it is the one thing that exists irreducibly. Everything else—all experiential states in nature—are merely patterns of excitation of this fundamental subjectivity, just as different musical notes are patterns of vibration of one and the same guitar string."

No, that's way, way wrong. You are a thinking, knowing, believing, loving, caring, planning, questioning, seeing, hearing, creating, imagining, willing, speaking, reading, aspiring, instantly learning, recognizing, striving, enjoying, suffering and comprehending unified self, a person capable of insight, compassion, moral choice, self-introspection, instant recall, philosophical inquiry, appreciation and spirituality. Such realities and capabilities are not anything like musical notes, and are not intelligently described as  "excitations of subjectivity."


armchair reductionism

The dialog below illustrates the stupidity of trying to explain human minds by describing a human mind as mere "consciousness" and then trying to create a "theory of consciousness" that applies to everything conscious. 

James: John, I've made great progress in explaining how the human body arises during a mother's pregnancy.

John: Great, tell me about it.

James: I call my explanation a “theory of solidity.”

John: A theory of solidity?

James: Yes, because that's the essential nature of human bodies, that they are solid. So my theory attempts to explain how solidity arises.

John: I think you've gone in the wrong direction, and made a big mistake.

James: Why?

John: Because a human body is something gigantically greater than mere “solidity.” A human body is a state of vast hierarchical organization, with a oceanic level of functional complexity. For example, in our bodies are 20,000 different protein inventions, most very special arrangements of many thousands of atoms. And we have 200 types of cells, each so complex they are compared to factories. You would do nothing to explain so impressive a reality of physical organization by merely explaining “solidity.” Your body is something gigantically more than mere “solidity.”


James: John, I've made great progress in explaining how the human mind arises.

John: Great, tell me about it.


James: I call my explanation a “theory of consciousness.”

John: A theory of consciousness?

James: Yes, because that's the essential nature of human minds, that they are conscious. So my theory attempts to explain how consciousness arises.

John: I think you've gone in the wrong direction, and made a big mistake.

James: Why?


John: Because a human mind is something gigantically greater than mere “consciousness.” You and I are not merely “some consciousness.” We are thinking, believing, seeing, reading, hearing, loving imagining minds with insight, emotions, viewpoints, and a great variety of mental powers such as instant learning ability, the ability to hold memories for decades, and the ability to instantly recall knowledge when only hearing a word or seeing a face. Human minds and human mental experiences are a reality of oceanic depth, so much more than mere “consciousness.”

The main problems with materialism are not that it postulates that matter exists but (1) that materialism fails to credibly explain minds, which are realities of the most enormous and stupendous diversity of capabilities and experiences, and (2) that materialism fails to credibly explain the most impressive examples of matter that we observe (such as human bodies so enormously organized). You do not get rid of the problems with materialism by simply getting rid of matter. 

Although idealism seems less plausible than dualism, it could conceivably be that only minds exist, but only if there existed some stupendous reality explaining why so many humans would have the same types of perceptions suggesting an external existence of matter. You could only explain that by postulating some transcendent reality capable of explaining the day-to-day uniformity of human experiences (rather as Berkeley did), not by postulating that there are only human minds, without matter. 

"Just say there's no matter" is not a sensible strategy for dealing with the explanatory shortfalls of materialism and "brains make minds" dogma. The wise direction is "something much more," not just "something much less."

Some of the essays at the Essentia Foundation are very bad examples of falsehood and nonsense. But on the plus side, the web site of the foundation does show a willingness to publish essays from thinkers with a variety of viewpoints, and some of the essays are laudable. So it may be worth periodically checking the site for essays worth reading, if you have the time to sidestep the abundant junk.   


I think readers of all viewpoints may agree that the site needs a physical reformatting, to make it easier to read on laptops. Currently when viewed on laptops the articles have about twenty words per line, which is tedious to read. 

There are three reasons why material reality is the greatest embarrassment to atheists. The first is that astronomy observations tell us that the universe suddenly originated in a very fine-tuned way, just as if it has been specially created.  The second is that the laws and fundamental constants of the universe are fine-tuned with extreme precision, allowing a habitable universe. This involves physical fine-tuning we would not expect 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 random universes to have. The third is that the bodies of organisms such as humans show everywhere the most enormous purposeful organization, with the human body containing more than 20,000 types of complex inventions: more than 20,000 different types of protein molecules that each require a very special arrangement of hundreds or thousands of parts.  The human body is a staggering wonder of fine-tuned systems made of fine-tuned systems made of fine-tuned systems. Materialism lacks any credible explanation for such wonders of engineering within a body, Darwinism and gradualism being no such thing. And Darwinism is worthless in explaining how a speck-sized zygote progresses to become a body with so very many systems and interdependent components, largely because it simply is not true that DNA contains a specification of how to make a human body or any of its cells or any of the organelles of such cells. DNA does not explain how there appears  abundantly within a human body accidentally unachievable protein complexes, specialized teams of different types of proteins which are often so machine-like that they are nowadays often referred to as "molecular machines."

I can understand why an atheist might want to try to get rid of all of these realities suggesting that our universe, the human species and every human body is the result of purposeful transcendent agency, by some desperate-sounding "matter does not even exist" claim.  

Postscript: See my 2016 post here for a critique of a philosopher (Robert Lanza) who seems to take an  approach similar to Kastrup. Lanza calls his philosophy "biocentrism." In that 2016 post I state, "The biocentrism of Lanza and Berman apparently wishes to reduce the world to what goes on in the human mind, but their philosophy makes no attempt to describe anything that may be the source of human minds or the regularity of human experiences."

At the link here you can read quite a bit of a 2020 book by Lanza on his philosophy. I don't see any signs of improvement over the book I reviewed in 2016. Lanza gives us a great deal of murky talk about quantum mechanics, which does not clearly support the claims he is making. 

Sunday, November 16, 2025

Trying to Explain Memory, a Neuroscientist Gives Us Bad Descriptions and Vague Circuitous Hand-Waving

A recent NPR interview offers us an example of how empty-handed today's neuroscientists are when it comes to explaining how a brain could produce effects related to memory. You can read a transcript of the interview here. An interviewer announces that the subject will be "Why Do We Remember?" We are told that the person will be a cognitive neuroscientist specializing in memory, who has been researching memory for 25 years.  The person is Charan Ranganath who "directs the Dynamic Memory Lab at the University of California, Davis, where he's a professor of psychology and neuroscience." He has written a book called "Why We Remember."

I can understand why a neuroscientist writing a book on memory might pick a title such as "Why We Remember" rather than a title such as "How We Remember." The reason is that no neuroscientist has any credible detailed theory as to how a brain can produce any of the main phenomena of memory.  No neuroscientist can credibly explain how a brain could ever store information such as the information you learn in a school lesson.  No neuroscientist can credibly explain how a memory could persist for decades in a brain subject to such very rapid turnover of protein molecules, and subject to such constant remodeling of things like synapses and dendritic spines, which do not last for years.  No neuroscientist can credibly explain how a memory of something experienced long ago or learned long ago could ever be instantly retrieved by a brain, which has none of the things humans put in devices they manufacture to allow instant information retrieval (things like addresses, indexing and sorting).  So lacking any credible tale to tell of "how we remember," a neuroscientist might want instead to change the subject to "why we remember." 

But switching the subject to "why we remember" is a pretty futile task for any materialist, because so very much of human memory makes no sense from any kind of evolutionary standpoint.  For example, the history of musical achievement is full of cases of people who can play or sing many thousands of notes from memory (such as pianists who can play from memory all of the piano notes in a long piano concerto, or opera singers who can sing from memory long roles requiring the correct retrieval of thousands of notes, and also corresponding words). Why would anyone have such an ability, which has no survival value in the wild? And there are also many people who have memorized very long bodies of text such as the entire Quran or the entire text of an epic poem such as the Illiad or Paradise Lost ( retired teacher John Basinger memorized all 60,000 words of Paradise Lost). Why would anyone have such an ability, which has no survival value in the wild?

In the long interview on the topic of memory, neuroscientist Ranganath says scarcely a word about the brain. What he says about the brain is sometimes wrong. He states this:

"So the human brain is much more like the high-efficiency but also high-performance sports car. We're not designed to carry tons and tons of junk with us. And like you said, I don't know that anyone would want to remember every temporary password that they've ever had. So I think what it's designed for is to carry what we need and to deploy it rapidly when we need it."

The analogy is an extremely misleading one, because brains do not have any moving parts, and cars do have moving parts, such as the wheels and the steering wheel.  And by saying "we're not designed to carry tons and tons of junk with us"  and that we're designed to "to carry what we need," he is misspeaking very badly.  The average human can remember endless thousands of details about things he experienced in the past,  songs he heard, TV shows and movies he watched,  and a huge variety of things he does not need to know.  And humans can do things like memorizing hundreds of pages of text and memorizing many very long opera roles (as Placido Domingo did), and very long roles such as the role of Hamlet. It is not at all true that human memory merely "carries what we need."

Neuroscientists commit this type of error very frequently. They speak as if their ideas about how humans mind performed were derived from their dogmas about a neural basis of the mind, rather than from a thorough study of the best performances of human minds. 

Later we have more bad misstatements from Ranganath. He states this:

"Stress makes it harder to pull out the information you need when you need it. It basically kind of shuts down the prefrontal cortex."

No, it is in general not true that under stress a person's memory freezes up. When you watch the TV show Jeopardy, you see people under stress performing memory recall with lightning-fast speed. And every person who does well on a final exam at college is doing memory retrieval  very well under a stressful situation. There is zero evidence that the prefrontal cortex ever shuts down during conscious experience, except in the cases of near-death experiences, where people may have the most vivid and memorable experiences when the entire brain has shut down during cardiac arrest.  To the contrary, the neurons of the brain keep firing at a rate between about 1 and 100 times per second, during both normal waking consciousness and sleep. 

Ranganath then tries to make it sound like he has some understanding that stress damages memory. He states this:

"Then there's the issue of chronic stress, where we know that chronic stress can be actually neurotoxic for areas of the brain that are important for memory, like the prefrontal cortex and another area called the hippocampus. And that is really, I think, part of the problem that you see in people with PTSD, for instance."

PTSD or post-traumatic stress syndrome is a problem when people are disturbed or distressed by memories of traumatic experiences they had. PTSD is not some difficulty in remembering, as Ranganath has insinuated. Quite the opposite, PTSD is when people are distressed by unpleasant things they remember all too well.  

Later Ranganath gives us some nonsense trying to suggest that our memories are being devastated by the use of social media. He states this: 

"So there's a platform called Snapchat where the information literally disappears within, I don't know, 24 or 48 hours. And I think that's a metaphor for how technology can impact our memories in general."

No, actually, social media has not done anything to worsen people's memories.  Later we have more falsehood and nonsense from Ranganath when he says this:

"Those memories are being transformed little by little because the act of recalling them and sharing them changes it. So you tell me a memory, and it's no longer your memory. It's our memory because of the work that we put into in terms of transforming it."

No, actually when I tell you my memory of something, that memory of mine is not transformed; and it still is my memory. Later Ranganath repeats the unfounded neuroscientist legend that sleep does something to strengthen memories, an idea that is not well-supported by evidence. It is merely true that someone sleep-deprived might find it harder to learn as well as when he is sleeping normally.  He approvingly quotes some person saying the not-very-credible idea that sleep converts memory into wisdom.  

Ranganath sounds quite confused about memory in this interview.  He gives us no sign that he understands any neural basis for human memory. There is no such basis. No one has ever found the slightest speck of something someone learned by microscopically examining the tissue of that person's brain. Brains have not the slightest resemblance to a device for storing learned information, and not the slightest  resemblance to a device for instantly retrieving learned information or retrieving learned information at any speed. Memory is a spiritual or psychic or soul ability, not a brain ability. 

neuroscientist hand waving

Postscript
: I recently got further evidence of how false was Ranganath's claim below, suggesting people don't remember lots of old memories they don't need to remember:

"We're not designed to carry tons and tons of junk with us. And like you said, I don't know that anyone would want to remember every temporary password that they've ever had. So I think what it's designed for is to carry what we need and to deploy it rapidly when we need it."

I was watching a Youtube video about the 10 least popular television shows of 1966.  I performed these feats of memory recall relating to TV shows or TV personalities I have not seen or heard mentioned in about 60 years or more:

(1) Upon hearing the name of the 1966 TV show "Captain Nice" (canceled after a single season), I recalled its star was William Daniels. 
(2) Upon seeing an unlabeled photo of Judy Carne (an actress I have not seen on TV or heard mentioned in about 60 years), I instantly identified her as Judy Carne. 
(3) Hearing mention of an "Occasional Wife" TV show I once watched in 1966, and seeing an unidentified image of its star, I first guessed the person's name as William Calley. Later (still having heard no mention of the star's name) I thought to myself something like, "No, I think it was maybe Michael Calley." The actor (who did no famous work after 1966) was named Michael Callan, a name identical to my final guess, except for the last syllable. 
(4) The next night I had a dream of some office worker I had not spoken to or substantially thought of in 37 years. At first I failed to recall the name of this person I would only briefly see on any day, but soon correctly recalled his full name. 

The fact is that humans my age can recall all kinds of obscure useless memories from 50 or 60 years ago, memories never reactivated during such a period. There is no credible neural or evolutionary explanation for such an ability.  If your brain stored memories, you would not be able to remember any old memory you had not used for more than a year, because of the very high molecular and component turnover in brains. The proteins that make up synapses have an average lifetime of only a few weeks or less. 

Wednesday, November 12, 2025

A Neuroscientist Mentions "Bad Brain but Good Mind" Cases, But Fails to Put Two and Two Together

 An article this year co-authored by neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga is entitled "Is Your Brain Really Necessary for Consciousness?" The article begins by discussing some important case histories of people with very badly damaged brains but good minds.  We read references to these cases:

  • The 72-year-old woman with "asymptomatic hydrocephalus."  The woman's case is reported in the paper "Asymptomatic Hydrocephalus" which you can read here. We see brain scan photos showing the brain of a woman whose brain tissue was almost entirely replaced by watery fluid. But the woman is described as "asymptomatic," a word meaning "without symptoms."  We read this: "The patient lived independently...Her developmental history was unremarkable; she had finished high school and had worked in various retail jobs. When our team examined her, she was alert and oriented, and did not report headache, visual disturbance or cognitive changes; her neurologic examination (including a Mini-Mental State Examination) was normal." The MMSE examination referred to is a test of cognitive ability often used to detect dementia.  You can only get a "normal" score on such an exam by doing most of a series of mental tasks such as counting backwards by 7 and correctly naming the current date and remembering three random words you were asked to speak five minutes ago. 
  • The bilingual guitar-player with near-normal language skills but little brain tissueThe title of the paper (which can be read here) was "Volumetric MRI Analysis of a Case of Severe Ventriculomegaly."  We have brain scan visuals showing that almost all of the 60-year-old man's brain was gone, with only a thin sheet remaining. But nonetheless the man's verbal IQ was a near-normal 88 (100 is average).  He could also speak two languages, and we are told he "plays guitar well."
  • The French civil servantThe case is discussed here in a Reuters story entitled “Man lives normal life with abnormal brain.” Inside a normal brain are tiny structures called lateral ventricles that hold brain fluid. In this man's case, the ventricles had swollen up like balloons, until they filled almost all of the man's brain. When the 44-year-old man was a child, doctor's had noticed the swelling, and had tried to treat it. Apparently the swelling had progressed since childhood. The man was left with what the Reuters story calls “little more than a sheet of actual brain tissue.”  But this same man, with almost no functioning brain, had been working as a French civil servant, and had his IQ tested to be 75, higher than that of a mentally retarded person. The Reuters story says: “A man with an unusually tiny brain managed to live an entirely normal life despite his condition, caused by a fluid buildup in his skull.” The case was written up in the British medical journal The Lancet in a paper entitled “Brain of a white-collar worker.” It is as if the authors tried to make these facts be noticed by as few as possible, by giving their story the dullest title they could. 
Below  is Figure 1 from the paper here describing the first case discussed above We see the "almost gone" brain of a woman who scored "normal" on a standard cognitive test (the MMSE). Photos B and C are closeups of particular brain portions. Photos A, D and E show the full brain from different angles. The black part are cavities filled with watery fluid, where the brain was hollowed out. 

good mind with very little brain


At first when reading the beginning of this article I foolishly had a fleeting glimmer of hope that maybe Michael Gazzaniga had been able to put two and two together after analyzing such cases. But such a hope was quickly dashed. In the rest of the article Gazzaniga gave us the silliest sophistry in response to such cases. 

What we got from Gazzaniga was the most bungling example of the fallacy of equivocation.  The fallacy of equivocation is what goes on when you use some reasoning that depends on a switch of the definition of a word, a switch that goes unannounced. Here is an example of reasoning guilty of the fallacy of equivocation:

Premise 1: It is not disputed by those in the music industry that Taylor Swift is a star. 
Premise 2: A star is defined by astronomers as a giant self-luminous sphere of gases such as hydrogen and helium. 
Conclusion: Therefore Taylor Swift is a giant self-luminous sphere of gases such as hydrogen and helium. 

Of course, this reasoning is nonsensical, and depends on an unannounced switch in the definition of the word "star" between Premise 1 and Premise 2. (In English the word "star" is defined both as a major entertainment person such as a well-known singer or well-known actor, and also an astronomical body such as the sun.)

It is just such equivocation nonsense that Gazzaniga engages in. He attempts to explain cases like the ones in the bullet list above, by arguing that we should not be surprised that brains can work well when their volume is low, because music can be good even when played at volumes that are low.  Gazzaniga states this:

"The volume of music is not the sole determinant of whether a song is good. The volume – the overall amount of sound participating at any given time—is one dimension of music, but there are many other components: the rhythm (low frequency waves which entrain the entire song), the harmony (higher frequency waves which structure the sound), the melody (highest frequency waves which tell the story). Music is the elaborate interplay between waves of sound, or vibration, in small, medium, and large (fast, medium, and slow), which braid together in a way that seems beautiful.

Similarly, the 'volume' of brains is not the sole determinant of whether a brain is good. The volume —the overall amount of brain participating at any given time—is one dimension of brain activity, but there are many other components: the circadian rhythms (low frequency waves which entrain us to the Sun and seasons), the central pattern generators (higher frequency waves which structure our heartbeat and our breathing), the real-time brain activity (highest frequency waves which allow us to analyze the world and tell the story)."

Notice the goofy equivocation word trick going on. Without any announcement of the change in definition, the definition of "volume" has been changed in the second paragraph. In the first paragraph "volume" means "the loudness level." In the second paragraph a switch is made to an entirely different definition of "volume," a definition of "the amount of space occupied by something."  The fact that the quality of music does not depend on the volume that music is played has no relevance to explaining cases of mostly-vanished brains combined with good minds. While giving this goofy equivocation fallacy reasoning, Gazzaniga goes off the rails by claiming that mere brain waves "allow us to analyze the world." The erroneous standard story of neuroscientists is that brains think, not that brain waves think. 

Gazzaniga continues this equivocation nonsense in three later paragraphs I won't quote, again making unannounced switches of the definition of the word "volume," trying to make it sound as if the volume at which music is played has some relevance to the anomaly that minds can function very well when there is very little volume of brain tissue. The two topics have no relevance to each other. 

Gazzaniga tries fruitlessly to beef up his glaringly fallacious reasoning about music and brains and minds, by making various false assertions. He claims that the brain is physically arranged like a symphony orchestra. That is not true, because viewed from a balcony a symphony orchestra is like a flat plane rather than something with a height as great as the width, and the left side of a symphony orchestra is not the mirror image of the right side. Gazzaniga makes this mostly untrue claim: "Neuroscientists have determined which part of the brain does what—we can point to a spot on a brain scan and tell you who sits there and what part they play—language is here, vision is there, memory is in that section." To the contrary, neuroscientists have failed to identify any part of the brain where memories are stored, and microscopic examination of brain tissue has never discovered any learned knowledge anywhere in the brain. No one has ever found a single word of human language by microscopically examining brain tissue. 

Gazzaniga has failed to pay attention to the case histories he has mentioned. The case history of the 72-year-old woman with almost no brain tissue (because of the replacement of brain tissue by a watery fluid) is a case of a woman who got a "normal" score on the Mini-Mental State Examination, an examination requiring good language skills for you to get a "normal" score. That case is inconsistent with the localization-of-function claims Gazzaniga is making. 

In his "memory is in that section" claim, Gazzaniga is probably appealing to the myth that the hippocampus is necessary for memory (a myth that collapses upon careful study, as shown in my post here).  It is interesting that Gazzaniga's own words later in the article help to discredit that myth. Referring to the case histories he mentioned (discussed in my bullet list above), he says, " Our friends above proved you can lead full and functional lives with 'only' a cortex." But that statement contradicts claims that the hippocampus is necessary for memory, because the hippocampus is not part of the cortex, and not near the cortex. You cannot live a "full and functional" life without having memory. 

In the remainder of the article, we have more music-analogy nonsense from Gazzaniga. Gazzaniga starts using the word "consciousness" to describe the human mind, using the trick I call shadow-speaking, which is when one misleadingly describes something to make it look like a mere shadow of what it is. Making one of the sillier statements I have ever heard a neuroscientist make, he states, "Consciousness is not an object—it’s a rhythm." 

Let us consider this word "consciousness."  It is basically the most tiny-sounding word you could possibly use to describe the human mind. According to one very common definition, consciousness merely means awareness.  So consider an ant that is aware there is a bread crumb next to itself. Is that consciousness? It would seem so. Is that awareness? It would seem so.  We see then how ridiculously diminutive the word "consciousness" is.  It is a word so slight-sounding that it can be reasonably used to refer to what goes on for a mere ant.

Is the term "consciousness" an appropriate word to use to describe the human mind? No, it is not.  You are engaging in very bad shadow-speaking if you use the word "consciousness" to describe the human mind. The reason is that human minds are almost infinitely more complex than mere consciousness. 

 The problem of human mentality is the problem of credibly explaining the thirty or forty most interesting types of human mental experiences, human mental characteristics and human mental capabilities. These include things such as these:

  • imagination
  • self-hood
  • abstract idea creation
  • appreciation
  • memory formation
  • moral thinking and moral behavior
  • instantaneous memory recall
  • instantaneous creation of permanent new memories
  • memory persistence for as long as 50 years or more
  • emotions
  • speaking in a language
  • understanding spoken language
  • creativity
  • insight
  • beliefs
  • pleasure
  • pain
  • reading ability
  • writing ability
  • ordinary awareness of surroundings
  • visual perception
  • recognition
  • auditory perception
  • attention
  • fascination and interest
  • the correct recall of large bodies of sequential information (such as when someone playing Hamlet recalls all his lines correctly)
  • eyes-closed visualization
  • extrasensory perception (ESP)
  • dreaming
  • volition
  • out-of-body experiences
  • apparition sightings 

aspects of human mind

Explaining these things is a very big and wide problem that we can call the problem of human mentality origination. It is a huge mistake to try to shrink that problem into some million-times smaller problem that you call "the problem of consciousness," and to speak as if it was merely consciousness that needs to be explained. 

Gazzaniga goes "all in" on this silly reductionist shadow-speaking, by first talking as if we had a mere problem of explaining "consciousness," and then further engaging in shadow-speaking by telling us that consciousness is a rhythm.  It's an enormously misleading trick in which Gazzaniga is trying to make the human mind sound like almost nothing. 

Deceptive shadow-speaking trick #1: Keep describing the human mind (something a million times more complex than mere consciousness) as "consciousness."
Deceptive shadow-speaking trick #2: Describe consciousness as a mere rhythm.

Engaging in equivocation, misleading statements and shadow-speaking, Gazzaniga  has failed to learn the main lesson taught by such neuroscience case histories he has discussed, cases of people with little brain tissue  or very damaged brains but normal or near-normal minds. For every case he discussed, there are more than ten other cases just as dramatic, and you can read about them in my post here, describing dozens of such cases. Gazzaniga seems like someone who just cannot put two and two together on the topic of whether brains make minds. He spent quite a few years studying cases of split-brain patients, patients without the nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. As I discuss at length here, such people with two separated brain halves retained a single unified mind, contrary to what we would expect under "brains make minds" assumptions.  Gazzaniga failed to put two and two together by realizing the very obvious implication of such cases of split-brain patients with a single unified mind and cases of people with little brain tissue but high mental abilities: the implication that the brain is not the source of the human mind. 

Saturday, November 8, 2025

No, You Can't Turn Memories On or Off in Mice, Nor Can You Do "Mind Captioning"

On the site NeuroscienceNews.com you can frequently find stories making unfounded boasts about the activities of neuroscientists. An example of the misleading stories we sometimes see on this site is discussed in my post here.  The latest example of an untrue headline at the site is the false headline "Epigenetic Switch to Turn Memories On and Off Created" The article makes these untrue claims: 

"Researchers have shown for the first time that flipping an epigenetic 'switch' in specific memory-holding neurons can directly alter memory strength. By targeting the gene Arc—which helps neurons adjust their connections—scientists used CRISPR-based tools to either boost or silence its activity in engram cells within the hippocampus. Silencing Arc blocked memory formation, while activating it strengthened recall, even days later, and these effects were reversible." 

The claims are untrue because the research being referred is an example of very low-quality science, being guilty of multiple examples of Questionable Research Practices.  It's a paper called "Cell-type- and locus-specific epigenetic editing of memory expression" which you can read here.

We have the same defects so typically found in rodent research on memory:

  • The study group sizes are way too small, between 3 and 12, and never greater than 12, with the average study group size being only about 7 rodents. No study of this type of this type should be taken seriously unless it used at least 15 or 20 animals per study group. 
  • Conclusions about how well animals recalled are based on the utterly unreliable technique of trying to judge "freezing behavior" in rodents. All studies using this technique are examples of junk science, for reasons I explain fully in the post here. So reliable evidence has not been presented in the study that the genetic or epigenetic fiddling produced any change in memory in rodents. 
  • The study made no use of any blinding protocol, an essential for a study like this to be taken seriously. 
If the authors of the study had bothered to act like good scientists and do a sample size calculation, they would have found out how ridiculously inadequate were the sample sizes they used. They confess their failure to do such a thing, and offer a ridiculous excuse, when they say this: " For in vivo experiments, no statistical methods were used to predetermine sample sizes, but the number of animals used in each experiment is similar to those reported in previously published engram studies." This is like saying, "I didn't pay my income taxes, but it's okay because none of my friends paid their income taxes." It is well-known that grossly inadequate and insufficient study group sizes are an epidemic within cognitive neuroscience studies involving rodents, and that the use of such way-too-small sample sizes is more the rule than the exception. So you do nothing to excuse yourself for failing to do a sample size calculation by saying that the sample sizes you used were comparable to those done by other published studies like the one you did. 

Every use of the phrase "engram cell" in the paper is unjustified. No scientists have ever presented  convincing evidence that any such thing as an "engram cell" exists. So-called "engram cells" are cells claimed to be parts of some area in a brain where a memory is stored, an area called an "engram."  No reliable evidence has ever been presented for the existence of either "engrams" or "engram cells." The type of studies claiming to have provided evidence for engrams are studies guilty of research practices as shoddy as the research practices in the paper "Cell-type- and locus-specific epigenetic editing of memory expression." 

When the paper makes the statement "In recent years, accumulating evidence has shown that memories are in part encoded in sparse populations of defined brain cells, so-called engrams," it is making a statement that is very untrue. No such evidence has accumulated, because all of the studies claiming to have produced evidence for engrams were junk science studies guilty of methodological sins as bad as in the paper "Cell-type- and locus-specific epigenetic editing of memory expression." 

Another bogus boast found in the recent neuroscience news is an article discussing the reckless human brain scan study discussed in the paper here, entitled "Mind captioning: Evolving descriptive text of mental content from human brain activity." Unlike the rodent study above, which only harms or kills a few mice, the study here involves serious needless risks to human subjects, who were subjected to 17.1 hours of medically needless 3.0 T fMRI brain scanning. 

The study had six human subjects watch 17 hours of videos for which text captions had been written, while the subjects were having their brains scanned. The authors claimed that by some weird convoluted "witches' brew" method of analyzing brain scans (some maze-like method all-but-impossible to untangle), they were able to "evolve" the captions to make them better.  It's an example of very bad junk science, partially because of the very inadequate study group sizes, and the hopelessly convoluted analysis pipeline, involving multiple "black boxes" such as large-language models. 

No study like this should be taken seriously unless it uses at least 15 or 20 subjects per study group. But only six subjects were used. The authors confessed that they failed to do a sample size calculation to determine whether their study groups were adequate for a decent statistical power, stating, "The sample size was determined on the basis of prior fMRI studies with similar protocols (765)." Since it is is well-known that the use of way-too-small study group sizes is an epidemic in today's neuroscience research (more the rule than the exception) appealing to "prior fMRI studies with similar protocols" is no excuse at all for failing to do a sample size calculation. 

In the wikipedia.org article for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, we read the troubling passage below:

"Genotoxic (i.e., potentially carcinogenic) effects of MRI scanning have been demonstrated in vivo and in vitro, leading a recent review to recommend 'a need for further studies and prudent use in order to avoid unnecessary examinations, according to the precautionary principle'."

2011 paper different from the 2009 paper quoted above states this:

"We observed a significant increase in the frequency of single-strand DNA breaks following exposure to a 3 T MRI...These results suggest that exposure to 3 T MRI induces genotoxic effects in human lymphocytes."

A more recent year 2024 study ("Evaluation of the Biological Effects of Exposures to Magnetic Resonance Imaging on Single-Strand DNA: An In-vivo Study") found similar results, finding that MRI scanners only half as powerful as 3T scanners can produce genotoxic effects.  It reported this:

"The DNA single-strand breaks were significant for all tested parameters in both MRI 1.5 T (p<0.01) and 3.0 T (p<0.001)....The percentage of cells destroyed in the group exposed to 3.0 T MRI was increased to 12.65 ± 1.0 after 10 minutes of exposure."

The younger a person is, the higher the risk of that person eventually getting cancer from long, unnecessary MRI scans. An experiment like this should never have used such absurdly long MRI brain scans of 17 hours, nor should it have used young subjects. All of the subjects were younger than 40, and one was only 22 years old. There is no reliable data showing the safety over decades of MRI scans of more than an hour. No one has studied whether experimental subjects getting long hours of brain scans have higher risks of cancer over a period of 20 or 30 or 40 years; and there is very much reason to fear that they do (the reasons being discussed in the quotes above)  Neuroscientists do not track the very long-term health of their human subjects, but instead follow a "scan 'em & forget 'em" policy.  Human subjects are being put at risk for the sake of parlor-trick poorly-designed low-quality studies such as the "Mind captioning" study, which don't give good evidence for anything, partially because of their "maze within a maze within a maze" designs, so cluttered up with black boxes, sneaky data injection backdoors,  and experimental "sleight of hand." 

reckless neuroscientist